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Abstract
This study looked at the relationship between rhetorical sensitivity, locus of control
and religiosity amongst college students at three fundamentally different college institutions.
Data were collected from 235 students. Results revealed that students belonging to the most
religiously fundamental group have significant differences from students outside that same
group.

A major finding was discovery of a positive relationship between rhetorical

reflectomess and fundamental religiosity as well as a negative relationship between rhetorical
sensitivity and fundamental religiosity. Also a significant but modest relationship was found
between external locus of control and rhetorical sensitivity and between internal locus of
control and noble selfness.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Down to earth,” “gullible,” “doesn’t think before he speaks,” “fundamental,”
“egotistical,” “dogmatic,” “lucky,” “argumentative,” “ultra-conservative,” “goodygoody,” “It must be fate!” “atheistic,” “open-minded,” “I think I can,” “right-wing,”
“holier-than-thou...” These are terms that are used to describe people or situations.
They have become stereotypical tags to describe behaviors, but do not usually reach
beyond the surface. For someone to earn one of the above labels, there is probably
something happening internally that leads others to perceive that person in such a way.
What leads to the perception is based, in part, on the observer’s own previous
programming and attitudes. For instance, I might consider you to be offensive, but
someone else may consider me to be offensive.

Perceptions lead to conclusions,

whether or not they are accurate. Unless we can measure and quantify the behaviors
and mind sets that lead to the labels, the perceptions can and will only remain on the
surface.
This thesis is about the relationship of three constructs and the complex matrix
that links the mind sets together.

This study is about interpersonal communication

based on how an individual (specifically a college student) perceives himself or herself
in terms o f attitudes toward encoding messages, internal/external control, and
religiosity.
Rhetorical sensitivity is a measure of one’s attitudes toward encoding messages.
The construct is useful in interpersonal communication studies and was first explored
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by Hart and Burks (1972) and Hart, Carlson, and Eadie (1980) developed a
measurement.
Rhetorical sensitivity is described as a continuum between two poles: the Nobel
Self and the Rhetorical Reflector (Darnell and Brockriede, 1976). Based on Hart and
Burks (1972) introduction o f the sensitivity construct, Darnell and Brockriede went
further to describe the “polar points” (p. 176). These “points” will be described in full
detail later, but for now it is enough to state that rhetorical reflectors have basically no
self to call their own and they are seen to “reflect” the rhetoric of others. Meanwhile,
noble selves “start with their own selves and project their own perspectives,
perceptions, and principles onto that other person (Darnell and Brockriede, 1976,
p. 177).
Locus of Control (Rotter, 1966) is a personality trait that for the most part
divides populations into two tendencies: internal and external.

Someone with an

internal control tends to attribute self for outcomes in life, where someone with an
external control attributes situations and outcomes to either chance or luck or some
other force.

Here too, it is not known exactly what leads someone toward one

tendency. Tendencies have also been known to change or shift throughout one’s life.
Locus of control is a popular construct to study because of the dichotomous nature and
its ease of use in correlation studies.
Religiosity is the construct that brings a deeper level of mind-set analysis into
this communication study. Because of vast differences in how religiosity is used and
described, it is not feasible to define the construct here. Some of the descriptors will be
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explored in a review of available literature later in this thesis.

For now, we will

describe it as a fundamental belief or lack of belief in Judeo-Christian dogma. It is also
a cognitive process and produces a dynamic not often examined in traditional
communication studies.

Some religiosity studies translate much like rhetorical

sensitivity with two poles: fundamentalism and atheism. It is difficult to find
concentrated populations of college atheists, but quite easy to locate fundamental
groups. Based on this, it is more practical to divide religiosity into the two groups:
fundamental and non-fundamental.
This thesis will examine the relationships among the three constructs of
Rhetorical Sensitivity, Locus of Control, and Religiosity. The purpose o f this thesis is
to learn what relationship (if any) there is between religious belief systems and/or locus
of control and rhetorical sensitivity.

4

Review o f Literature
Rhetorical Sensitivity. The foundational construct which serves as the communication
dimension of this study is the idea of rhetorical sensitivity. Although the identification
of rhetorical sensitivity is a fairly recent accomplishment, the basic construct can trace
its roots as far back as Aristotle. Rhetorical sensitivity is more than just a continuum of
conversational flexibility, it actually stems from a “system of attitudes” (Darnell and
i

Brockriede, 1976) that individuals posses. It is about adaptation (or lack of it) in
dyadic exchanges.
Hart and Burks (1972) offer perhaps the earliest discourse on the sensitivity
construct.

They write: “Because people are different, because our potentials for

thought and action vary greatly, and because people respond to social forces with
varying amounts of selectivity and intensity, effective inter-action demands that we
modify our rhetorical worlds in order to deal better with the worlds of others” (p. 82).
If how we interact was dependent upon situational factors alone, then exchanges would
certainly become highly predictable. For instance, if we were able to create perfectly
similar and controlled circumstances, and if situations alone triggered the human
response, then regardless of who participated in the experiment the outcome would be
the same. But we know that the process of communication involves the emergence of
“self.” The “se lf’ or “multiple selves” is explained as a “matrix of interrelated forces
that converge and work jointly to affect the behavior and choices of persons
communicating” (Darnell and Brockriede, 1976, p. 187).

The authors describe the

behavior not only as a process, but also as a continuum. To completely understand the
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boundaries of the continuum, the authors place two poles on each end with rhetorical
sensitivity somewhere between them.

The poles are noble selves and rhetorical

reflectors.
Noble Self.

Although a pure noble self or rhetorical reflector is a theoretical

description, the attitude set that belongs to such a person can encompass enough criteria
for us to fairly describe someone as representing the respective poles. Darnell and
Brockriede (1976) give four characteristics of noble selves: (a) They have a unitary
view of self, (b) Self is the primary basis for making communicative choices,

(c)

Noble Self tends to want to control rather than share choices, and (d) Noble Self is a
static and deterministic certainty that makes choices highly predictable.
A unitary view of self is what brings motivation or justification for behavior
that may be perceived as perhaps arrogant. The noble self sees himself or herself and
his or her viewpoints as necessarily correct and will not hesitate to point out differences
with others. Belonging to the noble self is more than just a concrete set of beliefs and
values. In his or her unitarianistic approach to verbal exchanges, the noble self also
transports a certain style of communicating which is also necessarily correct. In other
words, it is not just what is said but how it is said that makes the noble self unique. The
noble self communicates in a closed system (Darnell and Brockriede, p. 178).
According to General Systems Theory (Conrad, 1994), a closed system is one in which
change is not fluid. When new information is received into the system from another
system or an outside system, no reaction is made. Change happens only as a deliberate
process from within the closed system. A closed system in communication can be
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compared to a computer. New data may exist. You can tell the computer to change its
output. Obviously no change is made until an internal reprogramming occurs.
When a noble self communicates with another party, he or she may alter what
he or she says or how it is said. The altering is not an attempt to show sensitivity here
however. It is not fair to describe a Noble Self as someone who does not give a thought
to how he or she is communicating.

It could be said that since no measurable

sensitivity is calculated, that the Noble Self is one who will speak his or her mind
regardless of how it is perceived by others. This description is not accurate. A Noble
Self will alter his or her speech, but only to the degree that it contributes to the noble
self s own position. The Noble self finds himself or herself communicating with a
variety of communicators on the sensitivity continuum. Some exchanges may call for a
greater degree of intensity than others may.
The third characteristic of Noble Selves is the idea that Selves tend to want to
control conversations rather than share in the natural exchange of ideas. This too can
be regarded as a characteristic of operation in a closed system. It is not necessarily that
Selves enjoy listening to the sound of their own voice (though it just might often be the
case), but that there is a distinct perception that the other person does not have anything
important to contribute. By controlling or dominating the conversation, Selves attempt
to transfer their belief system while at the same time ignoring the belief systems of
others. In one sense, the mind set is machavalistic. Machiavellianism is defined as “a
high need to control others, regardless o f the attending ethical considerations”
(Widgery, Robin, Tubbs and Stewart, 1972).
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Because of the closed system in which a Noble Self operates, the behavior
becomes predictable. Unlike a noble self, a highly sensitive person will continually
draw upon a repertoire of selves and thus become considerably fluid in behavior,
always striving to enhance the communicative exchange. Prediction of behavior is as
complex as are the matrix that makes up the communicator. For a noble self, the Self
has a limited repertoire from which to draw and thus becomes quite predictable in what
behaviors and what rhetoric are displayed. New information does not affect or alter the
rhetoric of the Self; thus the behavior is both predictable and static.
Rhetorical Reflectors. Darnell and Brockriede (1976) also give four characteristics of
Rhetorical Reflectors: (a) They have no self to call their own. (b) They make their
choices based on the perceived need of the other person, (c) They are acted upon
rather than act, and (d) They are predictable based on the behavior of the other or upon
the situation.
The Reflector lives at the opposite end of the continuum from the Noble Self.
While the Noble Self basically has one self from which to choose from in interpersonal
exchanges, and the Rhetorically Sensitive has multiple selves from which to choose, the
Rhetorical Reflector has no self to call their own. Instead, the reflector “borrows” the
rhetoric of the people with whom he or she interacts. Although the reflector maintains
a basic set of beliefs and values, these ideals are rarely communicated and typically
become suppressed as they verbally and behaviorally take on whatever the values and
rhetoric of those around them are. As communication is exchanged between the
Reflector and other, the flow of ideas may alter the behavior of both parties, but the

reflector only changes based on where the discussion leads. If a Reflector is conversing
with a Noble Self, then typically the Reflector will become part of the S elfs system. If
conversing with someone who is rhetorically sensitive, the Reflector will not initiate
new information but will mimic and agree with the information provided by the other
person.
Because Reflectors do not choose to contribute to discourse, they become open
targets for the adhesion of dialogue from whomever they happen to be conversing.
They would be considered highly un-argumentative even in situations where they might
personally disagree with what has been said. In a platoon of new Army recruits, a
soldier may utterly oppose being awakened at 0400 to go running, but he must reflect
the rhetoric o f the sergeant. His opinion or ideas are not called for as he is in essence,
acted upon.
Reflectors then, are predictable. For whatever reason a person is classified as a
reflector, his or her communicative behavior is predictable based upon the behavior of
the other person(s). This extreme attitude toward allowing others to control the transfer
of information and remaining communicatively docile leaves the Reflector much like
film awaiting exposure. One need only to look through the lens of the other person to
see what outcome will result.
Tenants o f Rhetorical Sensitivity. Hart et al. (1980) deliver five basic tenants of the
mind set that makes up a rhetorically sensitive person. The first tenant is Acceptance of
Personal Complexity. This concept comes from an understanding that there is not a
one single self (as in the case o f Noble Self) that is active in every single dyadic
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exchange. The sensitive person sees him/herself as being made up of many “selves”
and any one o f those “selves” may be drawn upon to give optimum competence in
various situations. It also means that they do not dwell on specific inconsistencies that
may arise as a result of endless shifting between selves.
The second tenant is Avoidance of Communicative Rigidity. Here again we see
parallels to Communication Flexibility. As a key component o f the mind set, flexibility
in communication allows the rhetorically sensitive person to ignore what might be
perceived as societal expectations. A highly sensitive individual for instance, would
have no problem playing whatever role the situation called for regardless of how it
might make him or her look. There are no boundaries or set of rules for proper rhetoric
for the sensitive person.
The third tenant is Interaction Consciousness.

Without this tenant the

rhetorically sensitive individual has no data to support any of the roles which he or she
plays. Even though we discuss an attitudinal mind set possessed by an individual, we
explore only those attitudes that involve interpersonal interactions. One must have a
rhetorical exchange where decisions can be made and sensitivity manifested. Without a
read on the other person’s attitude, body language, tonal quality, facial expressions and
choice of words, a reaction cannot be legitimately inspired. A profound ability to have
an on-going consciousness of subtle changes in the interaction allows the individual to
make appropriate adaptations.
The fourth tenant is Appreciation of the Communicability of Ideas. As stated in
the statement of purpose for this paper, sometimes the values we claim to hold are not
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necessarily manifested in our communicative behavior. It is one thing to be completely
committed to a particular set of ideas; it is another thing for those ideas to become
encoded in every dyadic exchange. Being rhetorically sensitive typically involves
focusing on the needs of the other person involved in the conversation. This does not
necessarily mean that the other person has a particular need to hear the philosophy of
the other person. In fact, as Hart et al. (1980) states: “The rhetorically sensitive person
realizes that some social encounters demand that we say nothing at all...”(p.2).
The fifth tenant is Tolerance for Inventional Searching. A Noble Self or
Rhetorical Reflector is certainly exempt from this tenant. The rhetorically sensitive
person is one who will not communicate just to get out information. The interpersonal
exchange involves a complex process o f behavioral transformations. Every person and
every communication encounter is unique. Because of this, there is no rigid formula
that dictates how exchanges are to be made. Often times (if not daily) new situations
and occasions to engage in interpersonal communication arise. Perhaps a situation calls
for the rhetorically sensitive person to play a role that is absent in his/her repertoire.
The sensitive person is not only tolerant of the necessity to acquire or invent new
behaviors, but considers it to be part of the communicative process itself.
Relationship between Rhetorical Sensitivity to other Constructs. Rhetorical Sensitivity
is not related to communication flexibility (Martin and Rubin, 1994). According to
these

authors,

there

is

a distinct

difference

in

willingness

versus

ability.

Communication flexibility is a construct that measures one’s ability to adapt where
necessary, whereas “Rhetorically Sensitivity people are sensitive to others, believe
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changing is possible due to the constraints of the situation, and are willing to adapt
(Martin and Rubin, 1994. p. 173)."
On the other hand, some of the key descriptors o f the Communication
Flexibility construct may be also used to describe Rhetorical Sensitivity. Apart from the
discussion of ability, Communication Flexibility is based on the notion of adaptation,
change, and creativity (Spano and Zimmermann, 1995). In this essence, the definition is
the same: The Rhetorically Sensitive/flexible communicator is one who is able to
perceive the boundaries of a particular context and devise communication alternatives
that transcend situational constraints” (Spano and Zimmermann, 1995, p. 19).

The

Rhetorically Sensitive person must also possess an ability to adapt, so why are the
constructs not significantly related? Part of the answer lies in what Hart, Carlson and
Eadie refer to when describing the Rhetorical Sensitivity construct: “Rhetorical
sensitivity is a particular attitude toward encoding spoken messages. It represents a
way of thinking about what should be said and then, a way of deciding how to say it
(Hart, Carlson and Eadie, 1980, p.2). Conversational Flexibility does not consider the
attitudinal mindset that assists the communication process.
Another construct related by definition is Communicative Adaptability. Duran
(1983) defines this construct as “the ability to perceive socio-interpersonal relationships
and adapt one’s interaction goals and behaviors accordingly” (p.320). Here again we
see how the ability to adapt is what gives function to the construct. The rhetorically
sensitive individual adapts his behavior based on an appreciation of the Other’s point of
view or reactive behavior.

In Communicative Adaptability, adaptation is based on
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communicative goals of the individual. Many o f these constructs appear on the surface
to be measuring the same thing. Descriptions of the constructs are similar enough to
cause confusion.
Confusion between these constructs gave credence to a paper written by Steven
Ward and Dale Bluman. In their discussion entitled “Rhetorical Sensitivity: Missing,
Mugged, or Morphed?” they posit that perhaps the sensitivity construct has been
adequately measured by using alternative constructs. They write: “Clearly, research of
related concepts, especially when producing positive statistical results, will reduce the
drive to research rhetorical sensitivity5(Ward, S.A. and Bluman, D.L., 1997, p.5). The
authors in this paper attempt to explain just why it is that Rhetorical Sensitivity is not
recognized in main stream communication journals, as are other constructs. They make
the point that even as recent as 1994 the Handbook o f Interpersonal Communication
does not make mention of the construct directly.
What is inherently different in the Rhetorical Sensitivity construct is that in its
purest form it measures a set of attitudes toward communication. Portions of the
construct certainly cross over into similar constructs, but rhetorical sensitivity stands
alone as a gauge of latent attitudes. Situational constraints do not change these
attitudes, but rather draw out different behaviors of the same mind-set. This is why
Ting-Toomey (1988) found differences in rhetorical sensitivity scores when comparing
three totally distinct cultures. She writes: “The results o f this study indicate that there
are indeed cross-cultural differences in France, Japan, and the United States in their
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values and attitudes toward rhetorical sensitivity style” (p.35). Culture is known to
have direct bearing on the development of beliefs and attitudes.
Responses and changes in communicative behavior in a rhetorically sensitive
person is at best “slippery” (Hart and Burks, 1972, p.91). The rhetorical adaptations are
based on a mind-set that has been enriched with a life-time o f values conditioning.
What words are spoken and what style in which they are delivered may have significant
variance where the individual registers on the continuum of sensitivity. Other variables
certainly contribute in both motivation and manifestation. Personal values may
contribute toward how willing someone is to adapt their behavior.
Rhetorical Sensitivity and Religiosity.

Fulkerson (1986) addressed how Christian

values are reflected in one who may be rhetorically sensitive. In identifying taxonomy
of Christian values to compare to rhetorical sensitivity Fulkerson rejected assuming the
set of values belonging to self-described religious adherents since those values were not
necessarily religious.

Instead he used the Bible itself to serve as the taxonomy.

Fulkerson points out in his discourse that the Bible actually encourages rhetorical
sensitivity in order to meet communicative goals. For instance, he quotes the Apostle
Paul who said:
For though I am free from all men, I have made myself a slave to all,
that I might win the more. To the Jews I became as a Jew, in order to win Jews;
to those under the law I became as one under the law—though not being myself
under the law—that I might win those under the law. To those outside the law I
became as one outside the law—not being without law toward God but under the
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law o f Christ—that I might win those outside the law. To the weak I became
weak, that I might win the weak. I have become all things to all men, that I
might by all means save some. (I Corinthians 9:19-22 Revised Standard
Version).
There are many parallels to the basic tenants to Rhetorical Sensitivity to
Christian values expressed in the New Testament. “Let no one seek his own good, but
the good o f his neighbor” (I Corinthians 10:24), and “Let each o f you look not only to
his own interests but to the interests o f others” (Philippians 2:3) are examples o f
rhetorical rationales for adaptation. One area o f direct contrast however, is the concept
of “se lf’ and consistency-above-all ethic (Hart and Burks, 1972). The Bible takes the
position that there is a “real self.” The whole idea that man is to die to self at the
moment of conversion and become a new creation (II Cor. 5:17) is in stark contrast to
the first tenant o f rhetorical sensitivity. What then becomes o f the Christian convert is
a new motivation for all interpersonal communication. According to this philosophy,
the personal values may not necessarily get communicated in every exchange, but the
values do contribute toward the individual’s willingness to adapt.
The main point o f Fulkerson (1986) is that the “essential distinction between
Hart and Burks’ situation ethic and the rules-based ethic of Christianity is that the
former is driven by "concern for the complexity o f the Other’ but the latter by concern
for the Other” (p. 11).
Locus o f Control.

The evaluation of individual locus o f control is an attempt to

associate personal behaviors or interactions with personal beliefs. But bringing latent
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attributions of motivation to the surface is not sufficient to make conclusions or
generalities regarding behavior, because locus of control is only one level of abstraction
(Wimmer and Dominick, 1996) above individual orientation.

In other words, it would

be like concluding that the lamp doesn’t work while disregarding the fact that it is not
plugged in.

Thus it becomes necessary to move the discussion of locus of control

another notch up the abstraction plane and investigate some of the factors that may
affect self-reported locus of control designations.
Definition o f Construct.

The construct of locus of control is also referred to as

Internal/External Control. Studies that have included this construct as a variable have
consistently referenced the work of Julian Rotter (1966). Rotter’s research originated in
the discipline o f psychology and has been used in recent years to understand some
concepts in other disciplines, including communication.

Rotter (1966) gives a

substantial definition o f internal and external control:
When a reinforcement is perceived by the subject as following some action of
his own but not being entirely contingent upon his action, then, in our culture, it
is typically perceived as the result of luck, chance, fate, as under the control of
powerful others, or as unpredictable because of the great complexity o f the
forces surrounding him. When an individual interprets the event in this way, we
have labeled this as a belief in external control. If the person perceives that the
event is contingent upon his own behavior or his own relatively permanent
characteristics, we have termed this a belief in internal controls, (p.l)
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If one believes that conditions in life are due to one’s own behavior, the
decisions and thought processes will be different than from one who believes that
chance or luck are more responsible for the present conditions.
Recent Research Focus. The literature involving the construct of locus of control is
abundant and crosses many disciplines, but few studies explore the philosophical
aspects of the construct. By looking at how locus of control has been studied in the
past and some of the areas where it has been used will serve as a place to start this
discussion.
It has been shown (Davis and Phares, 1967, p. 557) that individuals whose
“reinforcement is contingent upon their own behavior tend to actively engage in
information-seeking to a greater degree than individuals who do not hold such a
generalized expectancy.” Joe (1971) also found internals to have greater informationseeking attributes.

In addition, Joe found that internals exhibit more initiative and

effort in controlling their environment. Another relevant aspect of locus of control was
studied by Booth-Butterfield (1989). In her study o f perceived harassment in the work
place, she posits that “in work settings internals may be very sensitive to nonverbal
cues and be aware o f potentially coercive situations, but not label the situation
threatening since they believe they can control it. Conversely, since externals do not
feel in control to combat harassment, even subtle cues may be viewed as threatening”
(p.265).
O f interest to this study is a finding reported by Joe (1971) regarding the
reception of communication from a prestigious versus a non-prestigious source. Joe
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reports that when identical information is presented from both a high prestige source
and a low prestige source that externals adjusted their response more than internals.
Since internals are less conforming (Ritchie and Phares, 1969), they do not rely on
environmental or social stimuli to dictate their responses. Instead, internals base their
responses on information.
Booth-Butterfield (1989) states that the internal reliabilities for Rotters I-E scale
(.65-.79) seem low for some research standards. Rotter (1975) cautions that the I-E
scale is not appropriate for all situations. He states: “the I-E scale is subject, as are all
personality measures, to the conditions of testing and the known or suspected purposes
or nature of the examinee” (p.62). Rotter also states that even though it would be ideal
to have a separate measurement for every facet of research, it would be an expensive
undertaking (Rotter, 1975). Rotter’s I-E scale does seem to satisfy many researchers
however. Hill and Bale (1981) discuss the use of the “unfocused generalized nature”
(p.287) of the Rotter’s scale and state that some researchers find the scale appropriate,
even if it leads to insignificant results.
Causation Theory. There is an entire body of literature that falls under the umbrella of
cognitive social learning theory. Germane to this theory is the concept of causation.
Understanding the principles of causation will help interpret the other theories
discussed here. The theory o f causation states that the orientation (internal/external)
begins in childhood. For instance, externality can be seen in the thinking of children
when they attempt to explain causes in the outer world (Reid and Ziegler, 1981). “An
example of animistic thinking would be the belief that a ball rolled down the hill
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because it wanted to do so” (p. 131). As a child matures and learns what behaviors and
actions he or she is actually in control of, it becomes natural to attribute events not
controlled as being external.
Even though psychology is the discipline that first experienced research with
the locus of control variable, by no means did the concept stay there. Applications of
this construct have reached beyond psychology and have shown up in disciplines such
as communication, health, sports, religion, sociology, education, and others. It is not
unusual that conclusions made within these disciplines are taken at face value. For
instance, “externals are found to be more likely to...” or “Hypothesis one was supported
which states that internals tend to...” Just by tabulating the results of a typical I-E scale,
it can become tempting to make these predictions. Although internal reliability of the
I-E scales are consistently greater than .7, the validity o f the scales may be significantly
distorted just by something as simple as semantics. For instance, interchanging the
words “lucky” and “fortunate” on a questionnaire may lead to different responses.
By understanding the construct within the context o f a higher abstraction level,
there is the possibility that the validity of these studies might increase. Williams (1992)
defines validity as “the degree to which researchers measure what they claim to
measure” (p.29).

The evidence that externally oriented individuals behave or react

differently according to certain criteria may satisfy some researchers, but it is entirely
possible that understanding why some subjects respond as they do may more accurately
measure the original question.
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Deterministic Heritage. Determinism is the belief that all human behavior or actions
result from uncontrollable forces. In direct opposition to this philosophy is the concept
o f free will. Babbie (1998) suggests that the fundamental question is this: “Is your
behavior the product of your personal will power, or the product o f forces and factors
that you cannot control and may not even recognize?” (p.69) It is a question not easily
answered as philosophers have debated this concept along with “Does God exist?”
When considering the concept of determinism for this study, references are held
in regard to cognitive orientations and not physical, technical, or some other scientific
orientation. There are studies to examine whether traits such as birth order (Eisenman
and Platt, 1968) or conditions of mental illness (Harrow and Ferrante, 1969) directly
affect locus of control. For instance Eisenman and Platt (1968) discovered that first
born males tend to have a greater external orientation.
The determinism paradigm is the supporting thread for B.F. Skinner’s work on
the concept o f behaviorism. According to Skinner (1971), external forces control our
behavior. Behaviorists emphasize that human action and behavior are directly and only
related to external forces.
Lefcourt (1976) directly challenges Skinner. Lefcourt suggests that belief in
free will is not irrelevant. He writes: “Whether people, or other species for that matter,
believe that they are actors and can determine their own fates within limits will be seen
to be of critical importance to the way in which they cope with stress and engage in
challenge” (Lefcourt, 1976, p.2).

Specifically, studies in areas such as health

(Wallston, B.S., Wallston, K.A., Kaplan and Maides, 1976) show that control
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orientation may lead to various health related behaviors.

Another direct challenge

toward Skinner’s philosophy is the suggestion that what Skinner thought would lead to
an orderly and mannerly world paradoxically can be viewed as a source of increased
violence (Lefcourt, 1976).
Also refuting the concept o f Skinner’s behaviorism is Glasser (1984). When
Skinner suggests that free will is an illusion, he attempts to remove any sense o f the
individual nature in man.

Glasser (1984) demonstrates the concept of free will by

comparing human motivation to an electronic device:
A telephone-answering device is a dead machine.

It has no choice but to

answer the phone. Its actions are controlled by the outside ring, and its sole
purpose, put into it by its all powerful designer, is to respond without question
to that ring. It is as truly a slave as only a robot can be. But if we believe that,
like machines, we are controlled by outside forces, whether as simple as a red
light or as complex as a tyrannical husband, and give up the idea that we always
have choices, we embrace slavery, (p.2).
Rubin and McNeil (1992) suggest that humanists, as opposed to behaviorists,
hold the belief that our ability to make judgments or choices is due to internal control.
Schlossberg (1983) makes the point that “[i]f man is all matter and his actions
completely determined by events over which he has no control, we may ask wherein
lies his uniqueness” (p. 149). Locus o f control cannot then be simply regarded as a
personality trait, but carries with some deeper philosophical ideology. To make the
connection would seem to be important in a study of the meaning of self motivation.
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The concept o f determinism versus free will may be the ancestral root for the
newer concept of locus of control. Determinism can be traced at least as far back as
Babylonian astrology (Schlossberg, 1983). According to the enlightened thinking of
the time, the belief in determinism was a welcome substitute for displacing the
“Christian anthropology.” As Schlossberg writes: “For if evil were not to be explained
by something inherent in man, then it was natural to look to circumstances for the
explanation” (p. 148).
In anticipation of a possible tautology between the concepts o f determinism/free
will and internal/external locus o f control, Waldman, Viney, Bell, Bennett, and Hess
(1983) examined the two constructs to see if they were correlated. There were two
basic assumptions or questions that led them into their research: (a) “Those who believe
in an internal locus of control may also believe in free will”, and (b) “Those who
believe in an external locus o f control may be more likely to embrace a deterministic
philosophy” (p. 631). By using the two scales: free-will determinism scale: (Viney,
Walman and Barchilon, 1982) and I-E scale (James, 1973)1 they were able to show a
low-order relationship between these beliefs.

The results showed that “belief in an

external locus o f control and belief in determinism are not necessarily the same thing.
Similarly, belief in free will and in an internal locus of control are not necessarily the
same thing” (Waldman et al., 1983, p.633). The authors suggest that this finding could
mean that a determinist could respond on a survey so as to reflect an internal locus of

1 James’ scale was used rather than the more common Rotter I-E scale because of James’ use of Likertstyle questioning as opposed to Rotter’s forced choice, since the objective was a correlation.
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control. The authors further state that the data used for their study strongly suggest that
the performance on the I-E scale has little to do with the belief in free will and
determinism (Waldman et al.,1983).
Babbie (1998) describes points of focus in reference to research design. Two of
the points o f reference are characteristics and orientations. Characteristics are described
as units of analysis that refer to items such as “Gender, age, height, marital status,
deformities, region of origin, or hearing ability” (pp. 99-100).

Orientations are

attitudes, beliefs, and other general tendencies. It should be feasible at this point to
include locus of control as a characteristic of unit of analysis. Whereas “free will and
determinism assess an attitudinal orientation” (Waldman et al., 1983, p. 634).
Another study (Stroessner and Green, 1990) examined dimensions of belief in
determinism.

The authors suggest that behavioral psychologists and fundamental

Christians might achieve similar scores for belief in determinism, but the basis for that
belief may be highly contrasted. For instance, a Christian may believe in a God who
determines his or her behaviors, whereas a psychologist (who does not necessarily have
a religious orientation) may believe in external control due to some other force.

It

becomes an important distinction when trying to predict certain behaviors because
conditions, which appear to be caused by associated variables, may actually have other
factors at work. The authors thus broke down determinism into two basic dimensions:
Religious-philosophical and Psychosocial. One of the hypotheses of the Stroessner and
Green study predicted that Religious-philosophical determinists would be more
external than libertarians (humanists...or free will agents) would. The reason cited for
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Religious-philosophical constituents to have a more external orientation was the idea
that determinism is based on the belief in an actual plan or purpose (Stroessner and
Green, 1990). The findings in Stroessner and Green’s study did not fully support this
hypothesis. It was shown that religious-philosophical determinists actually have a
higher internal locus o f control.
The authors explain the discrepancy by stating “Apparently, they [religiousphilosophical determinists] perceived such a plan to be quite personal, not impersonal.
The personal nature o f their conception o f these external forces may have been
responsible for the finding that religious-philosophical determinists had a more internal
locus of control than psychosocial determinists” (Stroessner and Green, 1990, p.798).
It would seem appropriate to investigate the dimension o f religiosity a bit further.
Although some social scientists and philosophers prefer to discuss the aspects of
determinism and free will in absence o f religion, it is clear that an argument can be
made for a careful look at the effects of religion on the cognitive dimensions of this
subject.

Reid and Ziegler (1981) suggest that belief in religion may be a natural

function of social learning. As children develop and begin to differentiate between
internal control and external control, there are many events or actions that are not easily
explained. Believing in some sort of religion or supernatural entity brings cognitive
relief for the unexplained (Reid and Ziegler, 1981). Even if parents teach their children
to believe in a god-type being, a child may grow to challenge that belief or accept it.
Religiosity and Locus o f Control. It has been suggested that belief in religion
(Stroessner and Green, 1990) should lead towards an external locus of control
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orientation. The authors speculate that since their hypothesis was not supported it may
have been due to the belief by religious-philosophical determinists that the Almighty’s
plan for them was more personal.

The propensity towards internal or external

orientation among religious populations cannot be determined easily through idealistic
means. According to accepted biblical framework, there is support for belief in the
deterministic function of the Almighty, such as: “Your kingdom come. Your will be
done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread” (Matthew 6: 10-11,
New King James Version). But there is equal support throughout scripture for a free
will conception, such as: “For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) nothing good
dwells; for to will is present with me, but not to perform what is good I do not find”
(Romans 7:18, new King James Version).
Although either orientation can be justified, it appears that to highly religious
people, the thought o f chance, or luck, may be uncomfortable. Lefcourt (1976) suggests
that among sub populations where highly idealistic or distinctive belief systems exist,
the traditional I-E scales may not maintain their integrity. A study done by Gabbard,
Howard, and Tageson (1986) recognized the idealistic extreme of what they describe as
Christian Fundamentalists. They developed a measure o f locus of control that revises
all references to luck and chance and replaces them with references to God or spiritual
entities. For instance, the Rotter statement “In my case getting what I want has little or
nothing to do with luck” becomes “In my case getting what I want has little or nothing
to do with spiritual guidance” (Gabbard et al., 1986, p.296). To determine reliability of
this measure, the researchers used the revised measure along with the original Rotter I-
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E scale.

The result o f their initial study showed that among highly religious or

fundamental populations, the revised religious scale showed a significantly higher
external orientation.
Understanding the locus of control in religious contexts is more than a matter of
semantics. Removing references to luck or chance on self-report questionnaires may
give more accurate results among certain populations, but in the Gabbard et al. (1986)
study mentioned above, a specific church body was used as subjects. The limitations
thus possibly become tied to specific indoctrination. In order to gain the most benefit
from obtaining accurate I-E orientations among religious groups, a standard, or a
measure o f religiosity needs to be employed. King and Hunt (1972) developed one
such measure. These authors present an exhaustive scale of religious behaviors and
beliefs such as Creedal Assent, Devotionalism, Congregational Attendance, Religious
Knowledge, Orientation to Religion, and Salience.
An appropriate caution regarding research among highly religious populations
comes from Rasmussen and Charman (1995). Suggested as a limitation in studies of
this nature, the authors suggest that the dogmatism inherent in some religions may
make personality and belief systems one o f the same.

“An individual’s personal

interpretations, meaning, and attitudes toward their religion will necessarily affect their
responses to the methods of investigation employed...” (Rasmussen and Charman,
1995, p.l 16). This premise thus fosters further support for determining how extreme in
religion the subjects are.
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In addition to understanding the “deeper” meanings of locus of control, it
should also be pointed out that there is a sufficient body or research that demonstrates
how perceptions can change when situations change. This “situational-based” criterion
may lead to similar biases contemplated beyond what is typically noted in a survey.
Loewenthal and Cornwall (1993) state: “general measures may mask effects that are
specific to situations” (p.40). If the study of hypothetical events and the attribution
tendencies that result were germane to a study, then it would certainly be reasonable to
take situational variables into account. There may be several factors at play in any
given situation that may cause behaviors to occur which override any aspect of
orientation. However, to study a sample’s ordinary disposition, free from situation,
would give results that would be easier to compare.

How someone responds to

hypothetical situations may also differ than how someone might respond in realistic
situations.
Some researchers account for situation by modifying the measurement to relate
to a particular situation. For instance, Sandoz (1996) used a modified I-E scale called
the MHLC (Multidimensional Health Locus of Control) to assess the degree to which
alcoholics within the Alcoholics Anonymous system attribute control over personal
health. Because of the spiritual aspects of alcoholics recovery and the degree to which
motivation comes through direct teaching of the “powerful others” concept (an external
orientation), it becomes natural to evaluate attributions in this light. Both situation and
sample have prompted researchers to adapt their measurements to apply to specific
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studies.

Early and especially contemporary studies have been highly critical of

undisceming uses o f the locus of control construct.
Hamilton (1991) has effectively fine tuned the direction o f locus o f control to
specifically fit within communication research.

Hamilton is somewhat critical of

studies that have treated locus o f control exclusively as a personality trait, and
furthermore, have treated it primarily as an independent variable. “One measured LOC
and then looked at the differences between internals and externals on a variety o f other
dimensions such as knowledge or political activity.

This implies that internals and

externals would always be so and, therefore, were doomed to respond to their
orientation” (Hamilton, 1991, p. 107). The author suggests that locus o f control has
several characteristics that are overlooked, one being its convertibility.
Religiosity.

Religiosity, as a construct, is open to as many interpretations as one is

willing to generate. But what makes religiosity of such keen interest to this study is the
versatility it presents when used as a correlate against most other constructs.

A

researcher may customize the variables and so define religiosity so that it can be
applied to any number of “problems.” One of the approaches to studying this construct
is reflective o f Rotter’s locus o f control.

Allport and Ross (1967), break down

religiosity into internal versus external (extrinsic/intrinsic).
Problems inherent in Defining Religiosity. In the definition process, the construct of
religiosity can be extended to measure specific aspects of religiosity.

For instance,

religiosity can be a measure of one’s moral values, belief in God, church attendance,
denominationalism, knowledge of the Bible, affinity toward life (or death), prejudice,
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conservatism, dogmatism, orthodoxy, and so on. These and many more variables can
be pieced together in researcher’s definition o f religiosity.
There are many studies (DeJong, Faulkner, and Warland, 1976; DeHaan and
Schulenberg, 1997; King and Hunt, 1975) that deal specifically with the multi
dimensional aspects o f arriving at an operational definition. Many instruments have
developed reliability and become useful for studying different ways o f being religious.
There are many studies such as Chamberlain and Zika, (1988) that only utilize a single
or perhaps two-dimension characterization.

For instance Reiss (1965) measured

religiosity by simply measuring church attendance.

The church attendance score was

then compared with the construct of sexual permissiveness. Socha (1978) states that
simply “measuring church attendance does not tap into all the complexity of
religiousness” (p.2). These studies tend to be vague and hardly generalizable, but they
do demonstrate a single dimension within a study.
To be sure, religiosity is a highly personalized mind-set. The simple question
“do you believe in heaven?” could have the same affirmative answer among several in
a population, but how each person arrived at the answer could be vastly different. A
child who is asked by a Sunday School teacher to think about heaven may conjure up in
his mind a day at the beach where he heard his father say “Ahhhhh, this is heaven.”
Semantics could also play havoc when conducting religiosity research.
Christian is used quite loosely in Western cultures.

The word

It means something entirely

different in say, the Middle East. In addition, when studied cross culturally, certain
dimensions have different results. For instance, DeJong, Faulkner, and Warland (1976)
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found that in comparing German students to American students they discovered that
“German students attend church less frequently, are less likely to endorse traditional
Judeo-Christian beliefs about God and death...” (p,871) and so orn Denominational
differences within domestic borders are also prone to show differences in the meaning
of some terms. Researchers must also account for highly religious people who don’t
attend church or low religious people who do. Brown and Lowe (1951) attempted to
carefully define their construct knowing about this complexity.

They state: “It is

obvious that the definition of religious belief employed here does not take into account
the religiosity which might be present among people who do not adhere to traditional
Christian dogma.

A person may not believe certain religious doctrines but still be

religious by other definitions” (p. 104). The above concerns are addressed when content
validity is established.

Each content area that is to be included in an operational

definition must be analyzed in detail (Martin, 2000).
Operationalization o f Religiosity. The operational definition used for any study
utilizing the religiosity construct is crucial. Without validity the results obtained from
research cannot be generalizable to any sample outside of the one being studied.
Chamberlain and Zika (1988), mentioned that results can vary according to “how
religion was measured” (p.411).
As mentioned earlier in the discussion o f locus of control, social learning can
have a major impact on the development of religiosity in an individual.

Learned

religious behaviors may become internalized at some point in life, or linger exclusively
as an external phenomenon. Many studies (Scarlett and Perriello, 1990, Francis and
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Pearson, 1987, Kotesky, Walker and Johnson, 1990) have focused on the changes that
take shape as a child proceeds through adolescence. DeHann and Schulenberg (1997)
describe a study that suggests that “adolescents become less reliant on rituals or visible
observations o f religious activity, and become more concerned with internal processes”
(p.539). Based on considerable empirical evidence that children undergo significant
changes in their religious belief system, it seems fair to conclude that religious attitudes
do result from cognitive activities and are not necessarily latent. Other studies, such as
Emsberger and Manaster (1981) reiterate that higher moral reasoning in adolescents is
the result of exposure to the teaching-learning process.
Intrinsic religious beliefs can appear to be related to relational competence and
communication skills.

Ragsdale (1994) states: “One might logically expect a

committed Christian to exhibit relational communication skill. For example, self
disclosure is necessary for fellowship. Empathy, interaction involvement, and listening
could be anticipated because they reflect concern for one’s neighbor” (p.268).
In the study o f religiosity many researchers have developed a certain typology
which has led toward the operationalization of the construct. To conclude this review
of literature on religiosity, a look into several of the typologies should bring to light the
appropriate approach this study will take in this present research.
One-Fold Typology. Brown and Lowe (1951) completed a project that demonstrates a
one-fold typology.

In this genre, a group o f questions are formulated, possibly in

Likert-style format.

In Brown and Lowe’s study the inventory consists o f fifteen

statements (in Likert-style).

Once completed, a score is produced and it becomes
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apparent what degree of religiosity the subjects hold. This index score then becomes
available for regressions with other variables.
Some researchers will actually use a one-fold typology as though it was two
fold. Even though the goal of the research is placement on a continuum of religiosity,
in essence the sample becomes divided into two basic types or extremes. These types
are not always defined, but the poles are apparent and well within view. There will
always be a median score based on the index, thus half of the sample will lead toward
the upper half or respectively the lower half. Whether or not the poles are given a tag is
completely up to the researcher and the purpose of the study. If the poles are identified,
perhaps two-fold typology is more appropriate. If not, then generally what is sought is
a degree of religiosity rather than a type. At the very least the verbiage within the
discussion will refer to the sample as “highly religious” or “low religious.”
Two-Fold Typology. The most common way to determine religiosity is apparently a
two-fold approach. When defined, the sample becomes divided into one o f two groups.
The operational definition is set up according to what information is being sought.
By using two types, a continuum between two poles is generated. Whether it is
internal versus external, mature versus immature, fundamental versus non-fundamental,
believer versus non-believer, intrinsic versus extrinsic, high versus low, or some other
dichotomy, the results become ready for correlation or cross tabulation.
As mentioned earlier, Allport and Ross (1967) have one o f the better known and
often cited instruments, which is clearly a two-fold approach. The authors divide the
sample into intrinsic and extrinsic.

Extrinsic religion is described as an orientation
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toward using religion as a means to an end. It is merely a show where piety dwells.
Intrinsic religion, on the other hand, is described as the primary motivational force in
one’s life. “Having embraced a creed the individual endeavors to internalize it and
follow it fully. It is in this sense that he lives his religion” (Allport and Ross, 1967, p.
434).
Three-Fold Typology. Another often quoted research team, Snell Putney and Russell
Middleton, put together a four dimension, three-fold study. The two types or poles,
based on scores from the four dimensional scales, are skeptics, modernists, and
conservative.

The overall construct employed in their study (1961) is Religious

Attitude or Ideology. In order to avoid some o f the problems faced with other studies
(such as being too narrow or broad in scope); the four dimensions measured completely
different aspects o f being religious, and were then compared. The dimensions were
orthodoxy, fanaticism, importance, and ambivalence. The unique characteristic o f this
approach is that extreme beliefs (such as atheism) will be identified.

Putney and

Middleton write: “Thus an atheist whose convictions were important to his selfconception might receive a spuriously high score if the scale were regarded as a
measure o f orthodoxy, and a spuriously low score if the scale were regarded as a
measure of the subjective importance of his belief’ (1961, p.286).
Another approach to a three-fold topology is a study conducted by Batson and
Ventis (1982). Batson and Ventis utilize the Allport and Ross (1967) scale of Religious
Orientation.

However, they posit serious doubts about whether this scale actually

measures what it is supposed to measure. In an attempt to remedy what they feel is
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lacking, they introduce a third way o f being religious: quest.

“An individual who

approaches religion in this way recognizes that he or she does not know, and probably
never will know, the final truth about such matters” (Batson and Ventis (1982, p. 150).
Because quest religion is an understanding that the pursuit o f religion is not an end or a
latent orientation, those who score high on this scale are ones that are prone to change
in their beliefs.
Four-Fold Typology. A study that can be classified as four-fold is by Allport and Ross
(1967). In this study they reformulate their original two fold topology (intrinsic versus
extrinsic) based on research conducted by Peabody (1961). In Peabody’s paradigm he
administered tests to subjects at different times. The questions were worded positive
during the first test and negative during the second. He discovered that some subjects
were consistent in their responses, but others had agreed to both wordings. Allport and
Ross applied that paradigm to their intrinsic/extrinsic model and produced the four-fold
topology. The first type is Intrinsic. These are people who scored high on the intrinsic
scale and also low on the extrinsic scale. The second type is extrinsic; those who score
high on the extrinsic scale but low on the intrinsic scale. The third type is
indiscriminately pro religious: those who score high on both scales. And finally, the
indiscriminately anti-religious or non-religious (those who score low on both scales)
were included.

Richards (1991) uses this same four-fold typology in a study but

changes the term indiscriminately anti-religious to nontraditionally religious. He states:
“the finding that most students classified as “anti-religious actually professed to believe
in a Supreme Being suggests that the terms anti-religious and non-religious,
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traditionally used to refer to persons in this religious orientation group, would be
misnomers in this study” (p. 191)
Five-Fold Typology. Citing the complexity o f the religiosity construct, Faulkner and
DeJong (1966) developed a five-dimension methodology that accounts for many of the
gaps in other instruments. The development of their “5-D” instrument was based on
the work of Glock (1962) who proposed that studies that limit the operationalization to
two or three dimensions would in essence exclude other dimensions. “[AJttendence at
church may be utilized as the identifying factor of the religious devotee.

Or,

affirmations o f belief in God plus a measure o f attendance at church may be combined
to provide an index of religiosity.” (Faulkner and DeJong, 1966, p.2).
dimensional

approach takes

into

account experiential,

intellectual, and consequential aspects of being religious.

ritualistic,

The five
ideological,

Taking the traditional

“Judeo-Christian” answer to questions in each o f the above categories, Faulkner and
DeJong measure respondent’s deviations from the traditional response.
The difficulty with this measurement is that recent surges in diversity bring a
complexity not realized by Faulkner and DeJong in 1966. The Judeo-Christian mindset
is not necessarily main stream in many communities, thus measuring deviations from
this mind-set may no longer measure what they wanted to measure. However, if this
present study is interested in learning what relationship there is between locus of
control, rhetorical sensitivity, and religiosity in a fundamental orientation, than this
measurement may be the best fit for such a study.
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Although this present study is certainly not a study o f the religiosity of college
students, the question of religiosity cannot simply be a nominal question. By doing so
there would be not be enough information to make a construct relationship study valid.
What is desired is to be able to distinguish between extremes. Are there attributes that
become predictable among highly fundamental religious students?

What about

students who score low? Perhaps religiosity is not significant in predicting rhetorical
sensitivity or locus of control.
In an attempt at operationalizing religiosity for the purpose of this study the
research of Brown and Lowe (1951) is again cited. The researches developed a simple
Likert style measurement that contains fifteen items. O f particular interest is that this
survey was tested among college students and found to be reliable.

The result of the

fifteen item survey will be an index score on a continuum between rejection and
acceptance o f Christian Dogma.
What makes the study of religiosity unique in America is the very diversity that
exists. In a “free culture” where individual make up of locus of control, rhetorical
sensitivity, and religiosity are unaffected by societal restraints, it is possible to view a
“snap shot” of one’s belief system.

In contrast to cultures (such as Islamic) where

religiosity is a shared trait, studies done in the United States explore the variance that
exists.

2 Spearman-Brown formula of .87 (p. 107)
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Statement o f Purpose
The potential to predict or alter behavior is one of the greatest benefits of
conducting social research. Learning how populations interact and communicate in the
world around them may teach us ways to improve those interactions.

Often times

research goes beyond simple observations o f interaction and questions the motivations
or orientations of the participants.

How or what an individual believes can certainly

affect their interactions and/or behaviors.
Sometimes the values we claim to hold are not necessarily manifested in our
communicative behavior. It is one thing to be completely committed to a particular set
of ideas; it is another thing for those ideas to become encoded in every dyadic
exchange.

Obviously not every interpersonal exchange reaches a level where

philosophy can flow, but even the ones that do are affected by an unlimited number o f
variables with the potential of altering the outcome.

Psychological orientations,

attitude sets, personalities, and situational factors contribute towards each interchange.
The values we hold dear are often times clouded by these potential filters.
Research has shown us that when a particular group o f people hold similar
beliefs or attitudes, certain behaviors or orientations become predictable. We can
measure interpersonal communication first hand, but what we learn is limited. We can
evaluate

semantics,

nonverbal

communication,

body

language,

para-verbal

communication, voice tone, and a number of other variables. None of these come close
to helping us predict what values are latent in the communicator. However, when we
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measure two or more particular orientations, it becomes more feasible to predict how a
subject would respond in a given situation.
If we were able to take a snap shot of our belief system at any given point in
time; we could see clearly the parameters or range of our beliefs. What we don’t see is
how we got to where we are. Our make up is so complex that it would be impossible to
ever have a complete inventory of the elements that have shaped us. Apart from the
benefit of genetics, our personal worlds begin taking shape in the womb and continue
throughout our lifetime. We may attend church...but why? Is it because our parents
took us to church every Sunday and it became a habit, or did we develop a sort of
insecurity at an early age that only going to church can pacify? Is our view o f God
based on personal study or peer influence?

Perhaps a bad experience at some point

altered our perceptions more so than any other influence ever could.
How we define a church denomination can also make a difference when we
attempt to describe why some people are catholic and some are not. If we look at a
denomination in the traditional sense (that is, we go to a particular church because our
parents went), then affiliation though heritage can be justified. It may come to mean
nothing more than a ritual. People who attend church merely because they have been
“programmed” to, can almost be referred to as being religious by default.
If we look at church going as a commitment to a set of ideas or attitudes, then
affiliation through cognition makes more sense.

In this sense, church affiliation is

merely a by-product of a higher level o f need satisfaction.
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Each person possesses a religious or idealistic belief system. The development
of the many factors, which constitute an individual’s make up, is a simultaneous
process. By using the tool o f self-disclosure, we can look at what the tendency o f belief
is a certain point in time.
At the same moment in time we can look at various attitude sets that have
developed from the exact same life experiences. What makes a person say exactly
what they are thinking only to offend someone else? Or what makes another person
hold their tongue when they know they disagree?

Could it be because o f a belief

system in place?
Situational factors can certainly contribute toward communicative behavior, but
what is o f interest to this study is how belief systems contribute to rhetorical
communication.
As stated in the introduction, the purpose o f this thesis is to learn if there is a
relationship between traditional religious belief systems and/or locus of control to
rhetorical sensitivity. This study is exploratory in nature. If a significant relationship is
discovered, it may open the door to future research involving these variables. Based on
the literature discussed here, the following research questions are proposed:

Ri

Is religiosity related to rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfhess, and/or rhetorical
reflectomess?

R.2

Is locus o f control related to rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfhess and/or
rhetorical reflectomess?
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R.3

Do fundamentally religious college students differ from non or less religious

college students in their levels of rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfhess, and rhetorical
reflectomess and locus of control?

R4

Can levels o f rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfhess, and rhetorical reflectomess

be predicted by both religiosity and locus of control?

Rs

Is there a difference in religiosity, locus o f control, rhetorical sensitivity, noble

selfhess, and rhetorical reflectomess based on the socio-demographic factors of school
attended, year in school, gender, degree major, church attendance, and religious
denomination?
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Chapter 2
Methodology
Rhetorical Sensitivity was measured using the 40 item RHETSEN scale (see
Appendix A) introduced by Hart, Carlson and Eadie (1980). The instrument contained
three sub-scales. The first sub-scale measures rhetorical sensitivity or RS.

In the

operationalization of the construct it was discovered that the two other encoding
attitudinal sets could also be measured from the same data by simply changing the
code. Darnell and Brockreide's (1976) concepts of Noble self or NS, and its polar
opposite, Rhetorical Reflector or RR, can be scored “similar to the method used in
scoring rhetorical sensitivity.” (Carlson, 1997 p. 10).
The measurement of locus of control took into account the special populations
that were part of the research.

Gabbard, Howard, and Tageson (1986) have done

specific testing o f locus of control among religious populations.

Because there is

special concern among highly idealistic or fundamental groups mentally rejecting
references to “luck” or “fate,” some modifications o f Rotter’s (1966) IE scale were
made and tested. Gabbard et al. (1986) came up with two revisions, both of which
maintained the integrity o f Rotter’s forced choice questionnaire. A Likert-style I.E.
instrument does exist (James, 1957) but too few studies have been done to show
validity. The first modification to Rotter’s measurement was to make references to
luck and chance neutral. The other modification made the same references to reflect
spiritual entities. Both modifications, according to Gabbard et al. maintain “slightly
higher validity coefficients” (p. 306). In order to obtain a reliable sample for this study,
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college students from both religious (fundamental) and secular institutions were
surveyed. The authors of this modification suggest that if you know a population to be
more fundamental, then the religious-revision can be used.

However “[a]n even

stronger case can be made for utilizing the neutral-revision in both general and
fundamentalist populations” (p. 306). The goal o f this research was to utilize a single
measurement for all populations. With that goal in mind, and based on claims made by
the authors, the neutral-revision of Rotter’s IE scale was used (see Appendix B). The
forced choice answers resulted in a single score for each participant. The scores from
the survey range from 0 to 23 with higher scores indicating a tendency toward an
external locus o f control and lower scores representing an internal locus o f control.
Religiosity was studied by using a measurement developed by Brown and Lowe
(1951) called “The Inventory o f Religious B elief’ (see Appendix C). The survey was
developed specifically for use among college students and has been shown to be a
reliable indicator o f acceptance or rejection of Christian dogma.

Even in diverse

populations, groups that typically do not adhere to traditional Judeo-Christian thought
will most likely score low. The format o f the instrument is Likert-type (five degree).
The instrument has fifteen statements of Judeo-Christian thought. The scores can range
from 15 (the least fundamental or religious) to 75 (the most fundamental or religious).
A brief demographic survey was included with the three instruments, (see
Appendix D). The demographic questions included information about class and major
as well as questions about church attendance and denominational influence. Students
enrolled at two private colleges and one state university were utilized. Questionnaires
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were prepared and all three instruments and demographic questionnaires were given at
the beginning of class periods in Introductory Speech Communications classes or
similar courses. Each student received a test packet in which answers were recorded.
Brief instructions and explanation were given as the tests were handed out to minimize
time allotted for examination.

A preliminary test showed that it would take

approximately 20 to 30 minutes to complete the entire questionnaire.
The three institutions utilized for this study were all in Minnesota. Each school
accepted the researcher’s Nebraska Institutional Review Board status (see Appendix E
for a copy o f the approval form). A total of 238 students turned in surveys, 48 from
Pillsbury Baptist Bible College, 82 from Crown College, and 108 from Southwest
State.
Research Question 1 asked if religiosity is related to rhetorical sensitivity, noble
selfhess, and/or rhetorical reflectomess.

This particular relationship has been studied

in a generalized manner (Hart, Carlson & Eadie, 1980), but no studies have been found
where the Brown & Lowe (1951) or similar scale was used. Pearson correlations were
mn between the three RHETSEN subscales and the Inventory of Religious Belief scale.
Research Question 2 asked if locus of control is related to rhetorical sensitivity,
noble selfhess, and/or rhetorical reflectomess. This relationship has also been studied
(Hart, Carlson, Eadie, 1980) but not using the Gabbard, Howard & Tageson (1986)
neutral-revision o f the locus of control inventory.

Pearson correlations were run

between the three RHETSEN subscales and the Locus of Control Inventory.
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Research Question 3 asked: Do fundamentally religious college students differ
from non or less religious college students in their level of rhetorical sensitivity, noble
selfhess, and rhetorical reflectomess? Subjects were divided into four groups based on
inventory of religious belief score (over one standard deviation (SD) above the mean,
the mean to one SD above the mean, the mean to minus one SD below the mean, and
below the mean minus one SD). A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to
explore this relationship with religiosity being the independent variable and the three
RHETSEN sub-scales (noble self, rhetorical sensitivity, and rhetorical reflector) the
dependent variables.
Research Question 4 asks if levels o f rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness, and
rhetorical reflectomess can be predicted by religiosity and locus o f control. A stepwise
regression was m n with the independent variables of religiosity and locus of control
and each of the three separate dependent variables (rhetorical sensitivity, noble
selfness, and rhetorical reflectomess).
Research Question 5 asks if there is a difference in religiosity, locus of control,
rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfhess, and rhetorical reflectomess based on socio
demographic factors of school attended, year in school, gender, degree major, church
attendance, and religious denomination.

One-way analyses of variance and an

independent t-test were used to explain these relationships. The dependent variables
were the five scales: Rhetorical Sensitivity, Rhetorical Reflectomess, Noble Self,
Religiosity and Locus o f Control.

For the analyses of variance, the independent

variables were the three sampled institutions (Southwest, Crown, Pillsbury); the four
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standard years in school (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior) and non-traditional
students; major (communication, psychology, other social science, and non-social
science); church attendance (everyweek, almost everyweek, occasionally, seldom, and
never), and denominational affiliation (regrouped into six general groups plus a seventh
group o f “Others”). For the independent t-test, the independent variable was gender.
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Chapter 4
Results
The three institutions that were sampled were Southwest State University (45%
of the sample), Crown College (34% of the sample) and Pillsbury Baptist Bible College
(20% o f the sample). All three o f these institutions are in the southern half of
Minnesota and draw students from both urban and rural environments. The majority of
students are from Minnesota. The students who participated in the research were asked
basic socio-demographic questions (see Appendix D). Table 1 presents the raw data in
terms of response frequency and percentage.
Students were asked to indicate which denomination affiliation comes closest to
how they would describe themselves. The largest group represented was “Baptist” at
27%. The next largest was Lutheran (18%) followed by Catholic (14%).
Other demographics included class, major, gender, and frequency o f church
attendance. Freshmen were the highest participating group (45%) with each subsequent
class number less. Non-Traditional students made up less than 1% o f the total.
Social Science majors other than Communication or Psychology had the highest
frequency o f participants (42%). Students who were not in social science fields were
the next highest group (38%). Communication students were the smallest group (9%).
There were slightly more females who participated (55%) than males (45%).
The frequency o f church attendance revealed that 47% o f the participants
attended church every week. The second highest frequency were those who attended
almost every week. (21%).

Those who attend church occasionally were the next

46

highest (15%), followed by those who attend several times per year (8%).

Those

students who reported that they never attend church were the smallest group. (7.5%).
Table. 1
Self-reported socio-demographic characteristics o f participants (N=240)
Ch ara cteri sti c,

ri

%

Catholic

33

13.8

Lutheran

42

17.5

Episcopal

2

.8

Assembly of God

8

3.3

Methodist

7

2.9

Presbyterian

4

1.7

Covenant

3

1.3

Church of Christ

3

1.3

Congregational

2

.8

Evangelical

20

8.3

Bible

2

.8

Baptist

65

Islamic

2

.8

Hindu

2

.8

Non-Denominational

20

8.3

Inter-Denominational

1

.4

Not Applicable

7

2.9

Other

17

7.1

Denomination

27.1

(Table 1 continues)
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(Table 1 continued)
Characteristic

n

%

Institution
Crown College

82

34.2

Pillsbury

49

20.4

Southwest State

109

45.4

Communication

22

9.2

Psychology

26

10.8

Other Social Science

101

42.1

Other

91

37.9

Freshman

107

44.6

Sophomore

66

27.5

Junior

39

16.3

Senior

26

10.8

Non-Traditional

2

Male

109

45.4

Female

131

54.6

Every Week

113

47.1

Almost Every Week

51

21.3

Several Times Per Year

21

oo
oo

Occasionally

37

15,4

Never

18

7.5

Major

Class

.8

Gender

Church Attendance
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In order to simplify the testing o f religious affiliation, the denominations were
categorized into seven basic groups that are generally similar in methods of worship
and church doctrine. The following table shows specifically how the denominations
were re-grouped.
Table 2
Denominational Re-Grouping Based on Similar Doctrinal Position

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

Catholic
Episcop

Lutheran

Methodist
Presby
Church of
Christ

Baptist

Group 5

Evangelical
Bible
Assembly of
God
Covenant
Congregation

Group 6

Group 7

Non-Denom
Inter-Denom

Islamic
Hindu
Not
Applic

There were 235 subjects who completed all five o f the scales (rhetorical
sensitivity, noble self, rhetorical reflector, locus of control and religiosity).

Means,

standard deviations and reliability for the five scales are presented in Table 3.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Reliabilities for RHETSEN IRS. NS. RR) Locus o f Control Inventory (LC)
and Inventory o f Religious Beliefs (REL) fN-235!
RS

NS

RR

LC

REL

33 .1 6

13 .2 6

6 .1 9

12 .3 6

63 . 51

7 . 63

6 .1 7

3.6

3 .3 4

12 . 5

Minimum

4

0

0

1

23

Maximum

52

39

21

21

75

. 80

.7 7

. 60

. 57

. 95

Mean
Stand. Deviation

Alpha
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RQ1 asks if religiosity is related to rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness and /or
rhetorical reflectomess. Religiosity is negatively related to rhetorical sensitivity
(r=-.234, p<.001) and positively related to rhetorical reflectomess (r=.269, p<.001);
there was no significant relationship between religiosity and noble selfness (see Table
4).
Table 4
Pearson Correlations between RS, NS, RR, LC, and REL

RS

NS

RR

LC

REL

Source
Rhetorical Sensitivity
Sig.

(2-Tailed)

Noble Self
Sig.

(2-Tailed)

(2-Tailed)

Locus of Control
Sig.

- .478**

.000

.000
- .022

Rhetorical Reflector
Sig.

- .847**

(2-Tailed)

.737

_]_74**

- .234**

.008

.000

- .152*

.082

.021

.212

- .051
.445

.269**
.000
- .092
.1 6 1

Religiosity
Sig.

(2-Tailed)

*p<.05. **p<.01.

RQ2 asks if locus of control is related to rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness,
and/or rhetorical reflectomess. Table 4 shows that locus o f control is positively related
to rhetorical sensitivity (r=.174, p=.008) and negatively related (r=-.152, p=. 021) to
noble selfness; there was no significant relationship between locus o f control and
rhetorical reflectomess.
RQ3 asks if fundamentally religious college students differ from non or less
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religious college students in their levels o f rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness,
rhetorical reflectomess, and locus o f control. The scores on the religiosity survey were
divided into four groups ranging from the highest (or most) religious to the lowest (or
least) religious. A one way ANOVA test was conducted comparing the means of, the
four quartiles against the other constructs.

Table 5 shows that there is significance

between religiosity and rhetorical sensitivity (p<.001), noble selfness (p=.041) and
rhetorical reflectomess (p=.001). No significance was found between religiosity and
locus o f control based on a comparison of means.
Table 5
One-way Analyses of Variance for four levels of religiosity

Variable and Source

df

MS

F

Sig.

7.6

.000

2.79

.041

5.98

.001

1.28

.283

Rhetorical Sensitivity
Between groups

3

377.63

Within groups

227

49.66

Between groups

3

101.35

Within groups

227

49.66

Between groups

3

71.24

Within groups

227

11.91

Between groups

3

14.12

Within groups

227

11.06

Noble Self

Rhetorical Reflector

Locus of Control

(Table 5 continues)
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(Table 5 continued)
Variable and Source

MS

df

F

Sig.

Religiosity
Between groups

3

Within groups

227

10975.57

699.59

.000

15.69

Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls tests were done comparing the religious levels
to the subscales of rhetorical sensitivity, noble self, and rhetorical reflector.

For

rhetorical sensitivity, the most religious (highest quartile) were significantly less
rhetorically sensitive than the other three quartiles. For noble self, the significance was
found between the lowest quartile (least religious) and the highest quartile (most
religious). The lowest quartiles were less noble self than the highest. For rhetorical
reflector, significance was discovered between the lowest half (least religious) and the
highest half o f the sample (most religious). The lowest half were less rhetorically
reflective than the highest half. See Table 6.
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Table 6
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on religiosity

Alpha {.05)
Religiosity Level

n

1

Rhetorical Sensitivity
Highest
Medium High
Medium Low
Lowest

62
59
53
57

30. 02

Noble Self
Lowest
Medium Low
Medium High
Highest

57
53
59
62

12 .11
12 .47
13 .13

Rhetorical Reflector
Lowest
Medium Low
Medium High
Highest

57
53
59
62

4 .89
5 .54

2

33.22
33 .78
36 .12

12 .47
13 .13
15 .01

6 .85
7.26

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

RQ4 asks if levels o f rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness, and rhetorical
reflectomess can be predicted by religiosity and locus of control. A stepwise regression
test was conducted (see Tables 7-9) between the three RHETSEN (dependent variables)
and the independent variables o f locus of control and religiosity.
For rhetorical sensitivity (Table 7) the analysis showed that RS could be
predicted by religiosity (df=2,224;(3=-.23; r2=5.5) and locus of control ((3 =.15,
r\

additional r =1.7). Thus the total amount of variance accounted for in predicting RS by
religiosity and locus o f control was 7.2%.
Noble self is predicted (Table 8) only by locus o f control (df=l,225;
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(3=-14.7;r2=1.7). Although Locus o f control is a predictor o f noble selfness, it only
accounts for 1.7% o f the variance.
Rhetorical

reflectomess

is

predicted

(Table

9)

by

(df=l,225;P.28;r2=7.1). This prediction accounts for 7.1% of the variance.

religiosity
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Table 7
Stepwise Regression Analysis for Rhetorical Sensitivity

Summary_______________________________
M odel
r7
R

A r2

Standard
Error of
Estimate

1

.243*

.059

.055

7 .18

2

.243b

.080

.072

7 .11

B

SE

t

Sig.

1 (Constant)

42 .27

2 .47

17 .11

.000

Religiosity

- .14

.04

-3.76

.000

2 (Constant)

37 .71

3 .16

11. 94

.000

Religiosity

- .14

.04

- .23

-3 .56

.000

Locus of Control

.33

.14

.15

2.28

.024

SS

Df

MS

F

728.26

1

728.26

14 .14

.

000a

9.81

.

000b

Coefficients0

- .24

Sig.

ANOVA0
1 Regression
Residual

11584.65

225

Total

12312.91

226

2 Regression

991.14

2

Residual

11321.77

224

Total

12312.91

226

a. Predictors: (Constant), REL
b. Predictors: (Constant),REL,LC
c. Dependent Variable RS

51.49

495.57
50 .54
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Table 8
Stepwise Regression Analysis for Noble Self

Summary_______________________
R2
M odel
R

.147a

1

. 0 2 2

B

A r2

Standard
Error of
Estimate
6 .07

.017

SE

t

Sig.

10.71

. 0 0 0

fi

Coefficients13

Locus of
Control

- .27

. 12

SS

Df

- .15

CM

1.56

1

16 .61

CM

1 (Constant)

MS

F

184.32

5 .00

.026

Sig.

ANOVAb
1 Regression

184.32

1

Residual

8299.83

225

Total

8484.14

226

a. Predictors: (Constant), LC
b. Dependent Variable NS

51.49

. 02 6 a
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Table 9
Stepwise Regression Analysis for Rhetorical Reflector

Summary______________________________
M odel
R?
R

1

.27 5a

.075

A r2

Standard
Error of
Estimate

.071

e

3 .45

B

SE

1 (Constant)

1.20

1.19

Religiosity

7.88

.02

.28

SS

Df

MS

F

218.62

1

218.62

18 .35

Coefficients0

t

Sig.

1. 01

.316

4.28

.000

Sig.

ANOVAc
1 Regression
Residual

2680.23

225

Total

2898.86

226

.

000a

11. 91

a. Predictors: (Constant), REL
b. Dependent Variable RR

RQ5 asks if there is a difference in religiosity, locus of control, rhetorical
sensitivity, noble selfness, and rhetorical reflectomess based on the socio-demographic
factors of school attended, year in school, gender, degree major, church attendance and
religious denomination. One-way analyses o f variance (ANOVA) tests were run on all
demographic variables except gender. Following the ANOVAs, post-hoc StudentNewman-Keuls tests were mn.
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The first test was run comparing the means of five constructs under
investigation (rhetorical sensitivity, noble self, rhetorical reflector, locus of control, and
religiosity) with where the students went to school (see Table 10).
Table 10
One-way Analyses o f Variance for Institution Attended

Variable and Source

df

MS

F

Sig.

Between groups

2

652.67

12 .29

.000

Within groups

232

53 .12

Between groups

2

223.93

6 .14

.003

Within groups

232

36 .47

Between groups

2

82 .64

6 .69

.001

Within groups

232

12 .35 .

Between groups

2

44.17

4.07

.018

Within groups

230

11. 06

Between groups

2

9348.5

121.48

.000

Within groups

232

76 .96

Rhetorical Sensitivity

Noble Self

Rhetorical Reflector

Locus of Control

Religiosity

For rhetorical sensitivity and noble self, there is a significant difference between
Pillsbury Baptist Bible College and students who attended either Crown or Southwest
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State. Pillsbury students were less rhetorically sensitive (see Table 11) and more noble
self than students from the other two schools. For rhetorical reflector, students from
Pillsbury were more rhetorical reflector than students from Southwest State. For locus
of control, Pillsbury students had more internal locus o f control than Crown or
Southwest State students. For religiosity, Southwest State students were less religious
than Crown or Pillsbury students.
Table 11
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on Institution attended

Alpha (.05)
Institution

n

1

Rhetorical Sensitivi
Pillsbury
Crown
Southwest

48
80
107

28.75

Noble Self
Southwest
Crown
Pillsbury

107
80
48

12.39
12.79

Rhetorical Reflector
Southwest
Crown
Pillsbury

107
80
48

5.36
6.51

Locus of Control
Pillsbury
Crown
Southwest

48
80
107

11.19

Religiosity
Southwest
Crown
Pillsbury

107
80
48

53.64

2

32.33
35.02

28.75

6.51
7.50

12.53
12.85

Note: Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

70.48
73.12
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The second oneway ANOVA test was run comparing the means of five
constructs under investigation (rhetorical sensitivity, noble self, rhetorical reflector,
locus of control, and religiosity) with the class position. Significance was observed
between class and locus of control and between class and religiosity (p<.001) (see
Table 12).
Table 12
One-way Analyses of Variance for Class Rank

Variable and Source

df

MS

F

Sig.

Between groups

4

106.53

1. 86

.119

Within groups

230

57 .41

Between groups

4

44.38

1.17

.325

Within groups

230

37 .96

Between groups

4

19.20

1. 50

.204

Within groups

230

12 .84

Between groups

4

27 .62

2 .54

.040

Within groups

228

10 .86

Between groups

4

907.80

6 .34

.000

Within groups

230

143.13

Rhetorical Sensitivity

Noble Self

Rhetorical Reflector

Locus of Control

Religiosity

60

For the construct o f locus of control, post-hoc tests show that there is a
significant difference between non-traditional students and all groups o f traditional
students. The non-traditional students were more internally controlled. It should be
noted however, that there were only two non-traditional students. See table 13.
For the construct of religiosity there is a significant difference between nontraditional students and freshman, sophomore, and junior students. The non-traditional
students were less religious than freshman, sophomore, and junior students, but again,
there were only two non-traditional students. See Table 13.
Table 13
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on Class Rank
Alpha (.05)
Rank

n

1

2

8.00

Locus of Control
Non-Traditional
Freshman
Sophomore
Senior
Junior

104
64
26
37

Religiosity
Non-Traditional
Senior
Sophomore
Junior
Freshman

26
64
37
104

2

2

1 1 . 87
12 . 50
12 . 96
13 .3 5

47 . 50
55 .4 0

55 . 40
61.39
64 .1 6
66 . 84

Note: Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
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The third oneway ANOVA test was run comparing the means of five constructs
under investigation (rhetorical sensitivity, noble self, rhetorical reflector, locus of
control, and religiosity) with chosen major (see Table 14). Significance was observed
only between major and religiosity(p<.001).
Table 14
One-way Analyses of Variance for declared major.

Variable and Source

df

MS

F

Sig.

Between groups

3

15 .28

.26

.854

Within groups

231

58.81

.16

.922

1.33

.265

1.96

.120

16 .83

.000

Rhetorical Sensitivity

Noble Self
Between groups

3

6.24

Within groups

231

38.49

Between groups

3

17 .17

Within groups

231

12 .89

Between groups

3

21.63

Within groups

229

11. 01

Between groups

3

2184.78

Within groups

231

129.85

Rhetorical Reflector

Locus of Control

Religiosity
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Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls tests show religiosity amongst communication
majors is significantly less than students who chose majors outside of Social Science
disciplines. (See table 15). These two groups were also significantly less religious than
students in Psychology or Social Science programs other than Communication or
Psychology.
Table 15
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on declared major.

Alpha (.05)
Maj or

Religiosity
Communication
Other
Other Social Sci
Psychology

n

2
26
64
37

1

2

3

52 .41
59 .87
67 .30
70.46

Note: Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

The fourth oneway ANOVA test was run comparing the means of five
constructs under investigation (rhetorical sensitivity, noble self, rhetorical reflector,
locus o f control, and religiosity) with the church attendance.

Significance was

observed between church attendance and rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness,
rhetorical reflectomess, and religiosity (see Table 16).
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Table 16
One-way Analyses of Variance for frequency o f church attendance.

df

MS

F

Sig.

Between groups

4

323.13

6 .02

.000

Within groups

230

53 .64

Between groups

4

92 .97

2 .51

.043

Within groups

230

37 .12

Between groups

4

64.40

5 .34

.000

Within groups

230

12 .05

Between groups

4

20.79

1. 90

.112

Within groups

228

10.98

Between groups

4

5249.84

77 .64

.000

Within groups

230

67 .62

Variable and Source

Rhetorical Sensitivity

Noble Self

Rhetorical Reflector

Locus of Control

Religiosity

For rhetorical sensitivity, post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls tests show a
difference that those who attend church either every week or occasionally are less
rhetorically sensitive than those students who attend several times per year (see Table
17). For noble self, tests show students who attend church several times per year were
less noble self than those who attend occasionally. For rhetorical reflector, students
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who attend several times per year or never are less rhetorically reflective than students
who attend occasionally.
Table 17
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on frequency of church attendance

Alpha I
:.05)
Frequency

n

1

Rhetorical Sensitivity
Every Week
Occasionally
Almost Every
Never
Several Times/year

111
36
50
17
21

31.35
32 .22
34 .58
35.76

Noble Self
Several Times/year
Never
Almost Every
Every Week
Occasionally

21
17
50
111
36

10.62
12 .12
12 .24
13 .79

2

34. 58
35.76
38. 86

12 .12
12 .24
13 .79
15 .08

Rhetorical Reflector
Several Times/year
21
4 .10
Never
17
4.89
Almost Every
50
5 .50
5 .50
Every Week
111
5 .78
Occasionally
36
7 .19
Note: Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

For religiosity, post hoc Student-Newman-Keuls tests revealed that students
who never attended church were least religious of all groups, and students who attended
several times a year or occasionally were less religious than those who attended almost
every week or every week (see Table 18).
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Table 18
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on frequency of church attendance

Alpha (.05)
Maj or

Religiosity
Never
Several Times/year
Occasionally
Almost Every
Every Week

n

16
21
37
51
110

1

2

3

40 .31
52 .67
53 .43
67 .51
70.48

Note: Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

The fifth oneway ANOVA test was run comparing the means o f five constructs
under investigation (rhetorical sensitivity, noble self, rhetorical reflector, locus of
control, and religiosity) with the regrouped denominational affiliation.

Significance

was observed between denominational affiliation and religiosity. No significance was
observed between affiliation and the remaining constructs (NS, RR, RS, LOC). (See
Table 19.)
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Table 19
One-way Analyses of Variance for frequency based on denominational type

df

MS

F

Sig.

Between groups

6

150.69

2.7

.015

Within groups

228

55 .81

Between groups

6

63 .20

1.70

.124

Within groups

228

37 .12

Between groups

6

19.76

1.55

.164

Within groups

228

12 .77

Between groups

6

12 .51

1.13

.348

Within groups

226

11.11

Between groups

6

2321.09

23 .39

.000

Within groups

228

99.23

Variable and Source

Rhetorical Sensitivity

Noble Self

Rhetorical Reflector

Locus of Control

Religiosity

For denominational affiliation, post hoc Student-Newman-Keuls tests revealed
that students that fell under the categories o f non-denominational, inter-denominational,
Evangelical, Bible, Assembly of God, Covenant, Congregational, and Baptist were
more religious than students who fell under the categories o f Methodist, Presbyterian,
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Church o f Christ, Catholic, Episcopal, Islamic, Hindu, (or those whose selection was
either “other” or “not-applicable.” (See Table 20.)
Table 20
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on Religiosity based on Denominational Type

Alpha (-05)
Religious Type

2

n

1

3 Methodist, Presbyterian,
Church of Christ

13

53 .46

1 Catholic, Episcopal

35

55.43

7 Islamic, Hindu,
Not-Applicable

28

56.46

2 Lutheran

42

56 .67

6 Non-Denominational
Inter-Denominational

21

70 .05

5 Evangelical, Bible
Assembly of God,
Covenant, Congregational

32

70.34

4 Baptist
64
Note: Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

71.97

For gender, a t-test was conducted. The only significant finding based on this
test showed that females do tend to be more religious than males (p=.029) (See Table
21 ).
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Table 21
Independent samples t-test for gender

Levene's Test

t-test for Means

Source

F

Sig.

t

RS

.42

.519

-1.82

233

.071

NS

1.82

.519

1.84

233

.068

RR

1.68

.519

1.03

233

.306

LC

.46

.519

-1.32

231

.189

10.00

.519

-2.20

233

.029*

REL

*p<.05

Note: Equal variances assumed.

df

Sig.(2-tailed)
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Chapter 4
Discussion
Research Question 1 asked if religiosity is related to rhetorical sensitivity, noble
selfness, and/or rhetorical reflectomess.

There was a significant relationship

discovered between religiosity and rhetorical sensitivity and between religiosity and
rhetorical reflectomess, but not between religiosity and noble selfness.

Research

Question 3 analyzes these relationships in more detail, but it appears that a negative
relationship does appear between rhetorical sensitivity and a positive relationship exists
between religiosity and rhetorical reflectomess. In other words, the more religious a
subject reported being, the less rhetorically sensitive she or he tended to be.
Conversely, those same students (higher religious) do tend to be more rhetorically
reflective.
At this point it is feasible to revisit the concept that Fulkerson (1986) suggested;
that the Bible actually encourages rhetorical sensitivity. When the Apostle Paul said, “I
have become all things to all men” (I Cor. 9:22 RSV), it now seems more like an
encouragement to be rhetorically reflective.

Look again at how Darnell and

Brockriede (1976) described Rhetorical Reflectomess: (a) They have no self to call
their own.

(b) They make their choices based on the perceived need o f the other

person, (c) They are acted upon rather than act, and (d) They are predictable based on
the behavior of the other or upon the situation. If people who score near or at the
highest level of religiosity are following the same mantra, they are not only predictable
and making decisions based on perceived need, but they have given up their own “se lf5
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and have done so willingly. It then makes sense that they score low on the rhetorical
sensitivity scale.

Recall the first tenant o f the rhetorically sensitive person (Hart,

Carlson, & Eadie, 1980). The tenant suggests that sensitive people see themselves as
having many “selves” from which to draw. Perhaps highly religious people, who have
“died to se lf’ perceive the Great Commission and/or Holy Spirit as the basic
manifestation o f their rhetoric.

With enough indoctrination and “groupthink,” the

results discovered from Research Question 1 make sense. Perhaps Fulkerson should
have stated that the Bible actually encourages rhetorical reflectomess, not rhetorical
sensitivity.
In addition to indoctrination at the collegiate level, the students at Pillsbury
share a culture that extends beyond the campus. The culture is fostered from youth and
exposure to ideals in contrast to the “latent” dogma is rare. It is no wonder why scores
in religiosity decline with class rank.

Another aspect o f the culture comes from a

concern for appearance (or perceptions). The need to be accepted within the culture is
a strong influence on behavior and may contribute to attitudes toward encoding
messages.
Research Question 2 asked if locus o f control is related to rhetorical sensitivity,
noble selfness and/or rhetorical reflectomess.

Because of the unique samples of

students studied, the modified Gabbard, Howard, Tageson (1986) locus o f control was
used. The reliability score on this measurement was low. Gabbard et al. discovered
that when giving Rotter’s (1966) IE measurement to fundamentally religious groups,
references to luck or chance may lead to answers in contradiction to how they really
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felt. A new measurement replacing reference to luck with religious vocabulary helped
to make fundamental samples more reliable. The authors also came up with a “neutral”
revision. Because the research in this present study sampled both fundamental and
non-fundamental students, the choice to use the “neutral” revision was made.

It is

difficult to say if the religious-revision would have made a difference in the reliability
score. According to Gabbard, Howard and Tageson (1986), a strong case “can be made
for utilizing the neutral revision in both general and fundamental populations”(p.306).
The results presented in this thesis must be tempered because of the low reliability of
the scale.
For Research Question 2 it appears that the more noble self a student reported
being, the more internal the locus of control appears. A significant correlation also
appears between rhetorical sensitivity and external locus of control.
It is entirely logical that the more noble self one is, the more internal one is.
Darnell and Brockriede (1976) suggested several characteristics of the Nobel Self. The
one characteristic that now stands out relating to these results is that noble selves have a
unitary view of self. With a mindset based on centrality, the noble self sees no other
person, factor, or force responsible for things that happen to him or her. The noble self
tends to not share choices. For a noble self to regard outside forces as a mechanism for
alterations in life’s course internal conflict would certainly result.
Conversely we see that rhetorical sensitive students in this study tended to be
external in their orientation.

We know that rhetorically sensitive individuals have

multiple “selves” from which to choose when engaging in dyadic exchanges.
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Rhetorically sensitive people are open systems that are constantly making decisions
based on perceived information. For a rhetorically sensitive person to externalize (or
accept from outside self) information that leads to decision making is consistent with
previous research and with the results of the Pearson correlations run for this present
study.
Research Question 3 asked if fundamentally religious college students differ
from non or less religious college students in their levels of rhetorical sensitivity, noble
selfness, and rhetorical reflectomess and locus of control. The answer is yes, there are
significant relationships between all three RHETSEN scales (none with locus of
control). The results are generally consistent with what was discovered in Research
Question 1. The highest quartile students on the religiosity survey were the lowest RS.
As mentioned, the fundamental subjects in this sample appear to share a common “se lf5
and the concept of “multiple selves” as is a tenant in rhetorical sensitivity is not a
tendency.

Consistent findings again appear that show that the highest half on the

religiosity survey were the most rhetorically reflective. This is a profound discovery,
but there is not a way, based on this research, to know why this is happening. As
mentioned above, it could be because of a shared mindset, but how is that mindset
developed? In the introduction to this thesis it was mentioned that there are unlimited
factors that lead one toward a particular religious mind-set. The findings of this study
echo that concept.
The results also showed a less significant discovery that was unexpected and in
some ways contradicts the previous findings. The lowest quartile on the religiosity
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survey were significantly less noble self than the highest religiosity quartile.

This

finding certainly needs further study, as speculation here extends beyond the empirical
nature of the results.
Based on a stepwise regression, both religiosity and locus o f control are
predictors o f rhetorical sensitivity when added together, and account for 7.2% o f at the
variance. However, locus o f control only adds 1.7%, so religiosity alone predicts 5.5%.
This result is consistent with the findings in previous research questions. However, it
should be noted that the review of literature revealed that there are literally hundreds of
ways to measure religion, so it would not be accurate to state that religiosity in general
is a predictor. It would probably be more accurate to state that scoring high on the
“Inventory o f Religious Beliefs” is a predictor of rhetorical sensitivity. O f course this
is true o f all o f the findings in this study, but it is probably most appropriate to mention
here.
The same religiosity is also a predictor o f rhetorical reflectomess.

This

relationship alone (without the benefit of locus o f control) accounts for 7.1% o f the
variance.

The significance discovered here may serve as a catalyst into further

research. There are enough tenants and/or characteristics o f similar nature between
rhetorical reflectomess and the type o f religiosity studied here that predictions are
possible and a hypothesis could certainly be written.
Noble self is not predictable based on religiosity. However, there is a difference
between the highest and lowest religiosity quartiles on noble selfness. As mentioned
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above, noble selves tend to be internal. Perhaps there are ego-related issues o f the very
religious and very non-religious that “come into play”.
Research Question 4 asks if levels o f rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness, and
rhetorical reflectomess can be predicted by religiosity and locus of control.

RS is

predicted by religiosity and locus o f control, NS is predicted only by locus o f control,
and RR is predicted by religiosity. It should be pointed out here that there are certainly
other variables that can affect these predictions. According to Hart, Carlson & Eadie
(1980) “certain social institutions (like churches, cities, colleges, and political parties)
may foster certain communicative predispositions” (p.4). In other words, it is likely
that there is more than a religious ideology at work here.
Research Question 5 asks if there a difference in religiosity, locus o f control,
rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness, and rhetorical reflectomess based on the socio
demographic factors o f school attended, year in school, gender, degree major, church
attendance, and religious denomination.
Because the three schools sampled in this study are “fundamentally” different,
some o f the significance discovered can certainly be attributed to the nature of cultures
present at each o f the institutions.

For instance, it was discovered that Pillsbury

students were less rhetorically sensitive. It has also been shown that Pillsbury students
were the most religious according to the religiosity measurement given (see Table 11).
The translation becomes redundant.
Another example also comes from Table 11. This result shows that Pillsbury
students were also the most noble self.

This was also shown in the discussion o f
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Research Question 3 because here again the Pillsbury students were the most religious.
Again, we see that Pillsbury students are more rhetorical reflector for the same reasons.
Virtually all tests based on school are synonymous with findings based on level of
religiosity, even the tests that only compare locus of control. Crown College appears in
the middle on every Student-Newman-Kuels test run comparing schools.

This is

indicative of the cultures present at each institution.
The next socio-demographic comparison was class. The two tests that showed
significance placed non-traditional students as significantly different from all other
classes. Since there were only two non-traditional students it would not be appropriate
to speculate what is happening here. It should be enough to simply suggest that nontraditional students (or for that matter, non-students) may be o f interest for future study.
Following class was the socio-demographic of chosen major. Although there
was a difference shown between majors based on religiosity, it should be noted that
Pillsbury did not have a specific communication major.

Because religiosity is so

closely tied to institution, the findings here are not conclusive.
The next socio-demographic comparison was church attendance.

Table 18

shows that there is a progression directly correlating church attendance and religiosity.
This is not only expected based on research, but it has face validity. In other words, it
is logical that it would turn out this way. It also helps us accept the other tests that were
not quite as expected.
For rhetorical sensitivity, the students who attended church every week were the
least rhetorically sensitive. This finding, once again, is consistent with the other
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research questions. But what wasn’t expected is that the next group who were low in
RS were the students who only attended church occasionally.

But even more

interesting was that the most rhetorically sensitive students were those who indicated
that they attend church several times per year. It is possible that “several times per
year” is a matter of perception. For some people “several times per year” could mean
two or three times, or for that matter it could mean even more frequently than “every
week”. In order to draw specific conclusions about RS and church attendance, a more
specific question about frequency needs to be asked.
The same group that scored highest on RS (several times per year group) also
scored lowest on the noble self scale. Those who attend church occasionally scored the
highest on noble self. Again, without defining church attendance more specifically, it
is difficult to speculate what that means.
Despite the vague nature o f the frequency demographic, the most interesting
finding was that students who attended church only occasionally were the highest
rhetorical reflectors.

Based on previous findings, this result is not expected.

Also

unexpected was the fact that the “never” group and the “several times” group scored
the lowest on the RR scale. Because there was such a strong relationship between
religiosity and RR, and because there was a strong relationship between religiosity and
church attendance, the finding here is puzzling.
The next socio-demographic is denominational affiliation. Students were given
many options and asked to choose the affiliation that comes closest to what they
considered themselves. The options were condensed according to generally similar
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denominations. Students that identified themselves under non or inter-denominational,
Evangelical, Bible, Assembly of God, Covenant, Congregational, or Baptist scored at
least 70 (out o f a maximum o f 75) on the “Inventory o f Religious Beliefs”. All o f the
other denominational affiliations scored in the mid 50s. This is a significant difference
but was expected.

The “Inventory o f Religious Beliefs” was able to isolate the

extremely fundamental group from the lessor or non-fundamental groups.

This

isolation becomes very visible in this socio-demographic comparison. It is interesting
to note however, that students who associated themselves as “not applicable,” Islamic,
or Hindu did not score the lowest on the religiosity scale. This group was classified as
the third from the bottom. This was not expected and suggests that some other factor
be at work in regard to these positions.
The final socio-demographic comparison that was done had to do with gender.
There was only one relationship that showed significance. It was discovered that in this
particular group females tend to score slightly higher on the religiosity scale.
finding is consistent with much research.

This
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Implications,
instrument,

If religiosity (as defined in this study) and scores on the RHETSEN
particularly

the

rhetorical

reflector

scale

share

some

of

the

same attitudinal mind sets, perhaps we are one step closer to developing a
way

to

measure

religious

vocabulary.

As mentioned

in the introduction o f this thesis, we can only

take a snap

shot of where

someone resides in his or her mindset. What we

don’t see is
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got to where they are. The relationships discovered in this

research
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bit
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relationships
more
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attitudes that make up a person.
Limitations. Although this study revealed some very interesting results, there were also
some limitations.

One limitation is that the reliability alpha score for the locus of

control measurement was only .57. Rotter’s (1966) initial I-E scale has had a large
gamut of reliability scores when used in studies, and some of them have been on the
low side. By using the modified neutral scale amongst a population that is so extremely
fundamental rather than the “fundamental version” the risk was run of obtaining a
lower reliability score. The obvious question now is: “would the religious version have
resulted in a higher reliability?” Fortunately the majority of the significance discovered
in this study focused more on religiosity rather than locus o f control.
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Another limitation o f this study has to do with the nature or culture o f a group
of students who were so fundamental. Even though there was a good reliable measure
o f religiosity, there are cultural norms in this group o f students that just could not be
measured.

Religiosity was measured, however the mindset that accompanies this

fundamentalism was nurtured well before these students arrived at college. Religiosity
is only the “wonderama” (...a shoebox with a hole cut to allow one to peek in on a
crafted scene) that suggests a much bigger picture.
Another limitation is related to the construct of religiosity itself. The Brown
and Lowe (1951) Inventory o f Religious Beliefs was very reliable in measuring a
certain type o f religiosity. On this measurement Baptist students scored very high and
all other denominations scored lower.

There are literally hundreds of different

measurements available that would have shifted the scores around dramatically. The
goal of this research was to isolate one type and examine that group against the
remaining students in that sample.

By doing this isolation we are blinded to

possibilities outside o f the way this measurement was configured. The unique sample
of students also ironically skews the results by having a disproportionate number of
Christians who participated.
There was also a limit in some of the sample sizes. For instance, there were two
significant results that were obtained on non-traditional students versus the rest of the
class. It happens to be that the sample size of the non-traditional students was only
two. I would caution any conclusion drawn from such a small sample.
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Another limitation of this study comes from the geographic location. What was
learned can only be generalized with caution since a good number of the students
sampled were from rural (small towns) around Minnesota. Geographical demographic
information was not asked, thus some assumptions are made here.
Finally it was discovered that the socio-demographic question o f church
attendance could be too vague. Some puzzling findings based on frequency of church
attendance have led to this suggestion.
Recommendations fo r Future Study. The results obtained in this study have brought to
the surface some potential future research ideas.

Since the rhetorical reflector
\

measurement is so directly correlated to highly fundamental college students, this
particular group should be studied further. One particular suggestion would be to move
the same study beyond college students.

If indeed there is a mindset that reaches

beyond religiosity, the scores should be very comparable.
Because this study used only one type of religiosity measurement, a future study
should explore other types.
This study was done to further understand the communication construct of
rhetorical sensitivity.

In doing so however we learned about the psychological

construct of locus of control as well as the construct of religiosity.

The particular

groups o f extremely fundamental students have now sparked the suggestion o f using
the same type o f population and then explore other communication theories.

More

needs to be done with this population to explore other attributes, which are native to
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this population. Rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness, and rhetorical reflectomess are
indeed a great place to start.
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Appendix A

Communication Survey
Please respond to each statement listed below individually. There are no
absolutely right nor absolutely wrong answers. For each statement, please
indicate your opinion by choosing one o f the five responses.
1.

People should always be frank and spontaneous in conversation.

Almost Always True

2.

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

A supervisor in a work situation must be forceful in his or her communication with
subordinates to be effective.

Almost Always True

13.

Infrequently True

It is acceptable to discuss religion with a stranger.

Almost Always True

12.

Sometimes True

You should share your joys with your closest friends.

Almost Always True

11.

Frequently True

One should keep quiet ratherthan alienate others.

Almost Always True

10.

Almost Never True

No matter how hard you try, you just can’t make friends with everyone.

Almost Always True

9.

Infrequently True

It is better to hide one’s true feelings in order to avoid hurting others.

Almost Always True

8.

Sometimes True

When talking to others, you should drop all your defenses.

Almost Always True

7.

Frequently True

It’s good to follow the rule: before blowing your top, sleep on the problem.

Almost Always True

6.

Almost Never True

A person should always laugh at an unfunny joke just to please the joke-teller.

Almost Always True

5.

Infrequently True

When talking to someone with whom you disagree, you should always feel obligated to state
your opinion.

Almost Always True

4.

Sometimes True

An idea can be communicated in many different ways.

Almost Always True

3.

Frequently True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

A person should tell it like it is.

Almost Always True

Frequently True
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14.

“Look before you leap” is the most important rule to follow when talking to others.

Almost Always True

15.

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

A person who speaks his or her gut feelings is to be admired.

Almost Always True

24.

Frequently True

You really can’t put a sugar coating on bad news.

Almost Always True

23.

Almost Never True

When talking to your friends, you should adjust your remarks to suit them.

Almost Always True

22.

Infrequently True

When someone has an irritating habit, they should be told about it.

Almost Always True

21.

Sometimes True

When angry, a person should say nothing rather than say something he or she will be sorry for
later.

Almost Always True

20.

Frequently True

When someone dominates a conversation, it is important to interrupt them in order to state your
opinion.

Almost Always True

19.

Almost Never True

When conversing, you should tell others what they want to hear.

Almost Always True

18.

Infrequently True

The first thing that comes to mind is the best thing to say.

Almost Always True

17.

Sometimes True

You should tell a friend if you think he or she is making a mistake.

Almost Always True

16.

Frequently True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

You shouldn’t make a scene in a restaurant by arguing with the waiter.

Almost Always True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

25.
Putting thoughts into words exactly the way you want them is a difficult
process.
Almost Always True

26.

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

If people would open up to each other the world would be a better place.

Almost Always True

29.

Infrequently True

If you're sure that you are right, you should argue with the one who disagrees with you.

Almost Always True

28.

Sometimes True

A friend who has bad breath should be told about it.

Almost Always True

27.

Frequently True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

There is a difference between the person who is being “diplomatic” and one whois “two-faced.”

Almost Always True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True
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30.

You should tell someone if they are about to embarrass themselves.

Almost Always True

31.

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

We should have a kind word for the people we meet in life.

Almost Always True

40.

Frequently True

It is better to speak your gut feelings than to beat around the bush.

Almost Always True

39.

Almost Never True

If a man cheats on his wife, he should tell her.

Almost Always True

38.

Infrequently True

“If you feel it, say it” is a good rule to follow in conversation.

Almost Always True

37.

Sometimes True

When you are sure that you are right, you should press your point until you win the argument.

Almost Always True

36.

Frequently True

Saying what you think is a sign of friendship.

Almost Always True

35.

Almost Never True

You should tell someone if you thing they are giving bad advice.

Almost Always True

34.

Infrequently True

If your boss doesn’t like you, there is not much you can do about it.

Almost Always True

33.

Sometimes True

One should not be afraid to voice his or her own opinions.

Almost Always True

32.

Frequently True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

Infrequently True

Almost Never True

One should treat all people in the same way.

Almost Always True

Frequently True

Sometimes True

RS Scale:
Score = total of items 1,3,4,5,7,9,11,13,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,23,24,26,27,28,30, 31,33,34,35,37,38, and
39 where a “C” response is given a value o f 2, a “B” or “D” response is given a value of 1, and “A” or
“E” response is given a value of 0.
NS Scale:
Score = total of items 1,3,11,13,15,16,18,20,23,26,27,28,30,31,33,34,35, and 38 where “A” = 2,
“B” = 1, and “C”, “D”, and “E” all equal 0, plus items 4,5,7,9,17, and 21 where “E” = 2, “D”= l, and
“A”, “B”, and “C” all equal 0.
RR Scale:
Score = total of items 1,3,12,13,15,16,18,20,23,26,27,28,30,33,34,35, and 38 where “E” = 2,
“D” =1, and “A”, “B”, and “C” all equal 0, plus items 4,5,7,9,17,19, and 24 where “A” = 2, “B” = 1, and
“C”, “D” and “E” all equal 0.
For normative data regarding these scores refer to Hart, R.P., Carlson, R.E., & Eadie, W.F. (March
1980). Attitudes toward Communication and the Assessment of Rhetorical Sensitivity, Communication
Monographs, 47, 1-22.
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Appendix B

Locus o f Control Inventory
The following survey is a series o f statements in pairs. For each number,
circle the letter o f the statement that you believe is the most true, even if you don’t
agree with either o f the statements. There are no right or wrong answers.
1. a.
b.

Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much.
The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy on them.

2. a.
b.

Many o f the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to powerful others,
People’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.

3. a.

One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don’t take enough interest in
politics.
There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.

b.

4. a.

b.

In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.
Unfortunately, an individual’s worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.

5. a.
b.

The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
Most students don’t realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by accidental
happenings.

6. a.
b.

Without providential forces one cannot become an effective leader.
Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage o f their opportunities.

7. a.
b.

No matter how hard you try some people just don’t like you.
People who can’t get others to like them don’t understand how to get along with others.

8. a.
b.

Heredity plays the major role in determining one’s personality,
It is one’s experiences in life which determine what they’re like.

9. a.
b.

I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
Trusting providence has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a
definite course o f action.
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10. a. In the case o f the well prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test,
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really
useless.

11. a.
b.

Becoming a success is a matter o f hard work, no other powerful forces are at work,
Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.

12. a.
b.

The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.
This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do
about it.

13. a.
b.

When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of
good or bad fortune anyhow.

14. a.
b.

There are certain people who are just no good,
There is some good in everybody.

15. a.
b.

In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with other powerful forces,
Many times we might just as well decide what to do by relying on powerful others.

16. a.

Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was fortunate enough to be in the right
place first.
Getting people to do the right thing depends on ability: powerful other forces have little or
nothing to do with it.

b.

17. a.
b.

As far as world affairs are concerned, most o f us are the victims o f forces we can neither
understand, or control.
By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world events.

18. a.

Most people don’t realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by happenings which
they can’t understand,
b. There really is no such thing as providence or fortune.

19. a.
b.

One should always be willing to admit mistakes,
It is usually best to cover up one’s mistakes.

20.

a.It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes y
How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are.

b.
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21. a.
b.

In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.
Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.

22. a.
b.

With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.
It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.

23. a.
b.

Sometimes I can’t understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give,
There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.

24. a.
b.

A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.
A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.

25. a.
b.

Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.
It is impossible for me to believe that providence or the will of powerful others play an
important role in my life.

26. a.
b.

People are lonely because they don’t try to be friendly.
There’s not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they like you.

27. a.
b.

There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school,
Team sports are an excellent way to build character.

28. a.
b.

What happens to me is my own doing.
Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the directions my life is taking.

29. a.
b.

Most of the time I can’t understand why politicians behave die way they do.
In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as on a
local level.

A answers on:
Questions 2,6,7,9,16,17,18,20,21,23,25,& 29 reflect external orientation.
Questions 3,4,5,10,11,12,13,15,22,26, & 28 reflect internal orientation.
Filler questions are questions 1,8,14,19,24, & 27
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Appendix C

Inventory of Religious Belief
This is a study o f religious belief. Below are fifteen items which are to be
answered in the following manner: Circle Strongly Agree if you agree
strongly with the statement. Circle Agree if you agree with the statement.
Circle Not Sure if you are in doubt as to whether you agree or disagree with
the statement. Circle Disagree if you disagree with the statement. Circle
Strongly Disagree if you disagree strongly with the statement. Remember to
read each statement carefully, and mark only one answer for each item.
People differ widely in their beliefs: Please indicate your own in the manner described.
1.
It makes no difference whether one is a Christian or not as long as one has good will for others.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
2.
I believe the Bible is the inspired Word o f God.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

3.
God created man separate and distinct from animals.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure
Disagree

Strongly Disagree

4.
The idea o f God is unnecessary in our enlightened age.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure
Disagree

Strongly Disagree

5.
There is no life after death.
Strongly Agree
Agree

Not Sure

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

6.
I believe Jesus was bom of a Virgin.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

7.
God exists as: Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

8.
The Bible is full o f errors, misconceptions and contradictions.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure
Disagree

Strongly Disagree

9.
The Gospel of Christ is the only way for mankind to be saved.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure
Disagree

Strongly Disagree

10.
I think there have been many men in history just as great as Jesus.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
11.
I believe there is a heaven and a hell.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

12.
Eternal life is the gift of God only to those who believe in Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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13.
I think a person can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
14.
In many ways the Bible has held back and retarded human progress.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
15.
I believe in the personal, visible return of Christ to the earth.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Not Sure
Disagree

Strongly Disagree

High religiosity is indicated by answering Strongly Disagree on Questions
1,4,5,8,10,13,&14 and Strongly Agree on Questions
2,3,6,7,9,11,12,15

Appendix D
Socio-Demographic Survey
A study in Communication
College Student Survey
You are being asked to participate in a study of communication and beliefs. You will remain anonymous.
The survey is in three parts with a slightly different format for each part. Please read each statement
carefully and follow the directions on each survey. There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply
looking for trends in general beliefs among college students. Please do not leave any question blank. If
in doubt, circle the answer that comes closest to the way you feel. Your participation in this survey is
strictly voluntary. It should take approximately 25-30 minutes to complete all three surveys. When you
are finished with your survey your instructor or survey representative will collect it.
Before you begin, please indicate the following:
Major
Circle one answer in each o f the following—
Gender:
Male
Female
Year in school:
Freshman
Sophomore

Junior

Senior

Other or Non-Trad

How often do you attend church?
Every week

Almost every week

Several times per year

Occasionally

Never

Choose the closest Church affiliation:
Catholic

Lutheran

Episcopal

Assembly of God

Mormon

Methodist

Presbyterian

Jehovah’s Witness

Southern Baptist

Covenant

Church o f Christ

Congregational

Seventh Day

Evangelical

Bible

Baptist

Jewish

Islamic

Buddhist

Scientist

Unitarian

Hindu
Interdenominational

Not Applicable

Non-Denominational
Other

Inquiries about this survey may be sent to: Paul Hartzell (763) 560-1773 or mockdata@aol.com
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